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The Critique of Abstract Individualism
(June 197h)
JohnW. Buell, B.A., Amherst College
M.A., Columbia University
Directed by: Professor William E. Connolly
The author examines two contrasting conceptions of hujnan nature-
the abstract individualist and social conceptions. The first
assumes tliat human beings are born with a set of basic desires
which determine the most important aspects of behavior. These
desires do not vary idth the society and society can only channel
or limit these. The social conception assumes that language and
vsocial institutions constitute in large measure an individual's
identity and that the needs of the individual vary id.th the society.
The author examines some philosophical aspects and implications
of these views. He then shows that different views of human nature
are closely connected to particular approaches to the stud;>- of
society. Lastly, he shows that different philosophies of moral
discourse as well as different understandings of contemporary
political issues are connected to differences in the view of
human nature one holds.
sINTRODUCTION
Many modern political scientists are fond of sayin
that their discipline has .noved beyond philosophical
speculation about such questions as human nature. The
task of political science is to establish laws of polit-
ical and social chanfje, and in this process empirical
research rather than speculation is necessaryJ Indeed,
whatever worth the great classics of political theory
have lies in some of the testable empirical propositions
which can be culled from them, such as Aristotle's
discussion of the causes of tyranny, rather than in
airy speculation on such topics as human nature.
Yet in the history of political thought views of
human nature seem to have been rather closely connected
with the way in v/hich theorists study human institutions
and action. And the ways in which theorists study man
also seem to have pushed their conceptions of human
nature in particular directions. Thus Hobbes's belief
that mail and society can be studied as we study a watch
seemed to reinforce and be reinforced by his conception
of human nature as a complex mechanism. Ihough the
connection here does not seem to be a matter of logical
entailment, each assumption puts pressure on the other.
^Sco for ijir.tance the introduction by Harry Eckstein
to Eckstein ajid David Apter, eds
.
,
Comparative Politics
.(New York: Free Press, I963).
The possibility of this connection first became
apparent to me in studying Hobbes, and I became curious
as to whether it was an accident of Hobbes
-s work or
something which could be seen in the work of other
political thinkers. I will argue in this thesis that
a view of human nature which may be characterized as
abstract individualist^ pervades much of mainstream
political science and that this view is connected to
a particular method of study popular in contemporary
social science.
The abstract individualist conception of human
nature suggests that man comes into the world with a
set of given or innate wants, needs, and purposes.
These basic drives in man are abstracted from any
particular society, and they determine the most
important aspects of man's action in society. Society
is basically a collection of these independent beings.
It can restrain and channel their impulses, but these
drives exist with or without society and cannot be
basically altei-ed by it.
This philosophical anthropology implies a number
of other important ideas. It suggests that human reason
2Steven Lukes discusses many ramifications of the
concept individualism, including': the concept abstract
individualism in his Individualism
,
(New York: Oxlord
University Press, 1973).
merely channels or lincis outlets for the given human
passions. The reasons people give for actions and the
concepts developed in social life are not basic to human
action. They come after the fact. This conception of
human nature is also dot orministic—man is a being who
is driven by his innate passions and his actions are
regarded as the inevitable result of the passions and
their opportunity for gratification.
The first chapter of this thesis, then, will be
devoted to spelling out the contours of this conception
of man through an examination of its first great spokes-
man, Hobbes. Then the connection of this view to ways
in which man is studied will also be considered.
In the next chapter I will argue that a remarkably
similar view of man pervades the work of mainstream
political science. My principal example here will be
Robert Dahl, especially his work on the nature of
political inquiry and on American democracy. liith
Dahl, as with Hobbes, the view of man bears a close
connection to the methods of study adopted by the social
scientist and the ways in which societies are evaluated.
The belief in basic passions underlying our most im-
portant actions with the accompanying view of human
reason and determinism imply that the proper study
of man must bo the search for laws which govern man's
behavior. Furthermore, it is believed that in the
quest for such laws the moral values of tho investifrat or
can and must be kept separate from his scientific in-
vestitTatioDs
.
Political scientists are not to be faulted because
one can discover in their work such a connection between
an implicit view of human nature and methods of study.
The problem lies rather in the fact that the connection
is unrecofjnized and the view of human nature unexamined
and inadequately supported. If a view of man and an
approach to science each reinforce the other, it is not
adequate to claim that views of man are unimportant or
"supported by evidence", for the method of study is not
ngutra l with ros[?ect to the answers to the cmcstion on
this point
. Because of this fact it is important to
look at a significant and historically influential
critique of the Ilobbesian position, that provided by
Rousseau. In chapter three I will spell out the social
view of man espoused by Rousseau and the ways in which
it systematically rejects the central assumptions of
Ilobbesian individualism.
As is the case with the atoniistic conception of man,
Rousseau's view carries with it implications for the
study and evaluation of society. In particular it
leads us to question the search for causal law-like
re{?ularities in human behavior and to reconsider the
connection between explanation and normative discourse
in social science. The fourth chapter will explore
these issues through an examination of Peter Winch's
The Idea of a Social Science in which a social conception
of man is developed, a conception with which a far
different approach to the study of man is connected.
This approach explains an individual's action at least
in part in terms of his reasons and denies that behavior
is determined in the natural scientist's causal sense.
And it assumes that the study of a society must begin
from an understanding of the concepts and beliefs a--ail-
ablc to the participants.
The moral implications of a social conception of
man will be examined in the fifth chapter. There I will
argue that Vinch has pushed a social conception of man
in directions Rousseau would never have found comfortable.
Rousseau maintains that human beings are social creatures
constituted in part by the language and institutions of
their society and, yet, also argues that some societies
are better than others. I will advance some arguments
in support of this apparently paradoxical position.
My purpose in spelling out these competing concep-
tions of human nature are threefold.
I hope to show, first, that a connection between
the methods of study and assumptions about man does
exist and thus that questions about human nature may not
be brushed aside or merely treated "empirically", for
What wc rocard as empirical treatment depends in part on
and helps sustain our view of man. There is a need for
social scientists to become more self-conscious about
the view of human nature they hold and its ties to many
aspects of their work,
A second purpose I have involves advocacy of a
particular perspective. I regard a social conception
of human nature as superior to the theories of abstract
individualism prevalent in mainstream political science.
In the course of delineating the social view of man I
will advance some philosophical arguments which support
this position and its implications.
Finally, this thesis is not intended to be merely
an academic discussion which will make social scientists
more solf-aware. We all hold theories of human nature,
at least implicitly, and policy differences often turn
on and sometimes can be better understood in terms of
the competinf? conceptions of human nature. In the
last chapter I will examine some public policy works
critical of certain aspects of American politics. T}iese
works differ si^vnifleant ly in outlook and proposals, and
I v;ill show that they can be better understood and judged
when we consider the images of man to which they are
Indebted. In fact serious consideration of a radical
notion or community, advocated by many today, is Tacil
itated by recc'.nizin,? tbat this idoal is indebted to a
defensible conception of human nature quite different
from that which prevails in our society and our social
science literature.
I
c n A p T E n I
IIOBBES^ AND ABSTRACT INDIVIDUALISM
Hobbes's Contract Theory and The State of Nature
In order to understnad the abstract individualist
conception of human nature and its role in contemporary
political science, a useful place in which to begin is
Thomas llobbes's Leviathan. Hobbes of course does not
present the only possible version of abstract individ-
ualism, but its central assumptions are clear in his
Avork, and his influence has been great even on those
who do not accept the political conclusions of his theory,
Hobbes expresses his conception of human nature in
the course of his discussion of the state of nature.
That conception underlies his view of social interaction
once human beings leave the state of nature and enter
the civil social state.
In the state of nature human bein^;s are actuated
by two basic passions: they seek endlessly after all
^This analysis of Hobbes is indebted to several
studies. The most useful to me have been John Plamenatz,
Miin Society . Vol. I, (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co.,
1963) and Sheldon Wolin, Politics and Vision
.
(Boston:
Little Brown and Co., I96O) and Norman Jacobson, "Thomas
Hobbos ns Creator," (New York: General Learning Pi-oss,
1971).
things which brine them pleasure and they try to avoid
violent death. Hobbes believes that these basic given
facts of human existence are reflected in our vocabulary
of good and evil. "Good" to Hobbes means no more than
that to which an individual aspires:
But whatsoever is the object of any man's
appetite or desire, that is it which he
for his part calls good.
, . For these
words of good, evil, and contenptiblo are
ever used with relation to the person
that uses them, there being nothing simply
and absolutely so, nor any common rule of
good and evil to be taken from the nature
of the objects themselves.
2
People in the state of nature are all relatively
equal, and so the condition which results from the pres-
ence of the basic instincts is a war of all against all.
Every man seeks power in order to gain security for his
possessions. The quest for power is not itself basic
but derives from fear in a world where all men are seek-
ing goods and all are relatively equal. Yet this quest
for power brings security for few. The equality of all
and their endless search for pov/er insures that life in
the state of nature will be a continuous war of all
against all. In a condition where each man must provide
his own security, ".
. .there is no place for industry
because the fruit thereof is uncertain; and consequently
2Thomas Hobbes, I.eviathan
, cd, by Herbert \v, Sclmeider,
(Indianapolis: Bobbs-i\errill Co., I958), p. 33,
no culture of the earth; no navigation, nor use of the
commodities that may be imported by sea
. . ., no knew-
ledee of the face of the earth; no account of time; no
arts; no letters; no society; and which is worst of all,
continual fear and dan/rer of violent death; and the life
of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.
This state of war would not end except for the fact
that people are also capable of reason. By the concept
reason Hobbes means that human bein,<;s are able to use
their minds in order to figure out prudential courses
of action which will better insure the secure attainment
of their basic desires. The role of reason as a puide
to the fulfillment of our passions is already implied
in the discussion of good and evil. It is made explicit
in the analysis ©f how men come to leave the state of
nature. There we are told that a law of nature is a
general rule "found out by reason, by which a man is
forbidden to do tliat which is destructive of his life . .
and to onjit that by which he thinketh it may be best
preserved .
"
The outcome of reason's quest for the secure sat-
-^Ibid., p. 107.
Ibid
. . p. 109
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Isfaction of man's passions is the social contract. This
contract is an afrreemont among all equal citizens that
each will obey a coimuon sovcreicn on tho condition that
his fellow citizens will likewise do so. The contract is
not between citizens and the sovereign but merely an
agreement among all citizens to give up the power to
pursue all objects of desire at will. it is the outcome
of prudential reasoning of beings motivated by their
individual ambitions.
Once the sovereign state is established the citizen
is under an obligation to obey the sovereign as long as
that sovereign provides order. When it no longer does
so it in effect ceases to be a sovereign,
Hobbes does not believe that people will be basically
changed ©ither by the process of making the contract or
by entering civil society. They will continue to pursue
their own individual desires within the limits enforced
by the state, and the state's ultimate weapon, the use
of force, is necessary to insure that each person's
egoistic passions will not go so far as to destroy the
social order. The preservation of order remains so
problematic that Hobbes feels it necessary to sug^rest
maxims to guide the sovereign in the preservation of
order. And even v/ithin society Hobbes expects that the
fear of death will remain so strong that persons charged
with capital crimes vlll resist attempts by the state
to aei.e the,„ and he regards such resistance as leciti„,at,
because the Tear of violent death led to the contract in
the first place.
Elements in Abstr^ict Individual! sm
In Hobbes's social contract theory we can find the
principal elements which constitute the abstract in-
dividualist or atomistic conception of human nature.
Before going on to discuss some of the consequences of
this conception of man, it would be useful to summarize
In a fjeneral way the basic elements of this view.
In the first place this conception regards each
person born into the world as the locus of a given set
•f fixed passions. The nature of the social ties or
the language community into which one is born does not
affect this essentially given human nature. Theorists
of the abstract individual may disagree amongst them-
selves as to the exact contours of these passions. It
is the shared assumption of a set of fixed passions
which unites them. Many theorists disagree with Hobbes
in attributing to people a set of exclusively solf-
rogarding instincts. Some attribute to man more benev-
olent instincts and so are not as pessimistic in the
political conclusions they derive from their conception
ef human nature. The important point is. however, that
the instincts are civen and are regarded as invariant in
their essential contours. In liobbes both before and after
the creation of civil society people want food, sex, and
property. Society merely limits the ways in which these
can be attained, but it does not change the basic objects
of desire.
Secondly, a major consequence of this understanding
of the passions is the implication that human action is
determined by the given passions. Obtaining certain
kinds of goods or performing certain types of behavior
produces pleasure, and human beings will inevitably
act in terms of these given drives. In addition to
asserting the presence of these basic passions the psychol
ogy is deterministic. Hobbes's determinism is reflected
in his famous comment on the will: "In deliberation,
the last appetite or aversion immediately adhering to the
action or the omission tliereof is what we call the will...
Thirdly, the psychology is deterministic not merely
because of its view of the passions but also because it
regards human reason as a distinct and subordinate capa-
city. The task of reason is to channel the passions in
such a way that satisfactory outlets for them are found.
5Op
.
ci t . , Ilobbes, Leviathan , p. 59.
7Reason is merely instrumental. It is not something which
partially creates or evaluates and reconstructs our given
feelln^rs. Hobbes remarks: "For the thou£^hts are to the
desires as scouts and spies, to ran^-e abroad and find the
*
way to the things desired.
.
."^
Hobbes view of reason is reflected in his definitions
of "emotion" concepts. He does not view these concepts
as essentially constituted or affected by the social and
linguistic context in which they develop. Keasen does
not enter into our emotions, nor does it subtly differ-
entiate those conditions which make a particular feeling
like resentment, love, ci'atitude appropriate. The concepts
refer rather to certain gut feelings present in all
cultures, feelings which are manifested in similar be-
havioral acts. For example, in defining the concept
love, Hobbes declares that "desire and love are the
same thing, save that by desire we always signify the
absence of the object, by love most commonly the presence
7of the same." Critics of Hobbes might wish to respond
that love is distinguished from desire by certain ideas
built up within a cultural context about the appropriateness
^Ibid
. , p. 68.
'^Ibid.
. p. 52,
and characteristics of the "desired object." Love as we
know it would not exist apart Iron, those ideas we have
built up about it. It thus cannot be reduced to a uni-
veral.eut feelin,-, something which becomes more clear
when v.e think about some of the different conceptions
of love which heave been built up in various cultures,
such as romantic and courtly love.
Lastly, an important aspect of the doctrine of
abstract individualism is that e^icn person is merely ah
object for others. Your actions may aid, impede or be
indifferent to my quest to fulfill my individualistic
passions and I will evaluate you accordingly. Relation-
ships are not valuable in and of themselves but only for
the private satisfactions to which they lead. Both in
and out of society human interaction remains external
and manipulative. Uhen men meet in society:
• . .if they meet for traffic, it is plain
every man regards not his fellow, but his
business; if to discliarge some office, a
certain market friendship is begotten, which
InUi more of jealousy in it than true love,
and whence factions may sometimes arise, but
goodwill never; if for pleasure, and recre-
ation of mind, every man is wont to please
himself most with those things which stir
up laughter by comparison of the other man's
defects and infirmities. , . And these are
indeed the true delights of society, unto
which we are carried by nature, that is, by
those passions which are incident to all
creatures. All society tliereloro is either
for gain, or j'or glory; tliat is, not so much
for love of our fellows, as for the loveor ourselves.
o
Examination reveals that these four aspects of the
doctrine of abstract individualism are closely related
thouf^h the ties are not of the strict lofrical sort. When
the passions are regarded as basic regardless of the
social structure it becomes more easy to consider human
behavior determined, though it should be pointed out that
one can be a determinist and reject every other aspect
of Hobbesian psychology. When passions are seen as given
entities which control behavior reason will easily be
treated as instrumental. And conversely, to regard reason
as instrumental makes it easier to be a determinist—the
given instincts will not be reconstitued through rational
interaction within society. Finally all of these views
are nicely congruent with a perspective which denies
any intrinsic importance to social ties.
The above tenets constitiite what I will call the
pure type of abstract individualism. I believe that in
most respects liobbes is an excellent example of a theorist
of this type, but other great thinkers reflect in muted
form some aspects of this doctrine.
The exact nature and significance of this doctrine
8Quoted in Norman Jacobson, Op . cit
.
. p. k.
will become more clear when it is contrasted with the
social view of .„an developed in chapter three. I now
want to Show that this conception of man is an important
doctrine because it is tied to a whole set of ways in
Which we study and evaluate the social world. I will do
this by pointing out some of the ways in which Ilobbes's
conception of social science is congenial to his theory
of human nature. I will then ar^o that some mainstream
political scientists hold an abstract individualist
conception of .nan as well as a view of social science
similar to Hobbes- s. In both cases the connections are
reciprocal: A view of science makes a particular con-
ception of human nature seem more plausible and that
view of human nature lends support to the favored con-
ception of science. These connections are not accidental
and will be found to hold for the social view of human
nature as well. In fact it seems hard to believe that
the question of how to study man can really be detached
from philosophical questions about the basic nature of
the bein^; to be studied.
Hobbes and Science
To understand Hobbes 's approach to the study of man
it is useful to put him in the context of his period. He
was an older contemporary of Newton, and like Kewton he
11
felt a great respect for the work of Galileo. He saw his
tasic as the creation of a science of politics and human
behavior, and he believed that all the work which preceded
his was idle and danf^erous speculation.
Science to Hobbes included two basic and related
concerns. First was the need to be,;in with precise def-
initions, for words derive their meaning from the things
to Which they refer. If the reference is not precise the
words are raeanincjless
.
Often words with imprecise refer-
ences become mere repositories for emotional reactions:
they certainly are not useful for scientific purposes
and their use constitutes a threat to social order.
Hobbes 's view on defintion becomes clear in some of the
key concepts discussed in the Leviathan
.
Thus power is defined as the present means of an
agent toward the fulfillment of some future apparent good.^
Power is one's ability to get that which he wants and is
therefore observable in the real world. It is significant
that this view of power lumps together all those means
^^^hioh contribute to the realization of one's wants. A
reputation for prudence and the implements of war are
both considered forms of power and no moral distinction
is made between them.""^ This fully accords with Hobbes 's
9QP» cit
.
.
Hobbes, Lcviatlian
. p. 78.
•'•^Ibid.
. p. 79
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requirement that the definition be "scientific." m add-
ition the definition assumes there is no distinction
between our stated preferences and our real interests. One
has power as lone as he can brin^ about what he wants. Our
articulated preferences grow out of our primordial wants.
Hobbes assun,e3 we cannot develop preferences which do not
correspond to our real needs. The given wants flow smoothly
into preferences and determine our actions. Hobbes 's
definition of the concept power fits both his conception
of man and of science.
Secondly, once the relevant terms have been precisely
defined, the problem or entity to be studied must be
broken down into its component parts. Hobbes believed that
such complex entities as a watch, a man, or a society are
composed of simple and isolable elements. Eventually the
researcher can demarcate and isolate for analysis the
simple building blocks of the unit to be studied. Hobbes
remarks
:
For as in a watch, or some small enf;:ine, the
matter, figure, and motion of the wheels can-
not well be kno^m, except it be taken in sunder,
and viewed in parts; so to make a more curious
search into the rights oi' states, and duties
of subjects, it is necessary (l say not to take
them in sunder, but yet that they be, so con-
sidered, as if they were dissolved.)
The purpose of this enterprise is not merely des-
''^Quoted in Sheldon wolin. Op. cit
.
, p. 2^7,
criptive. One searches for irreducible elements to find
causes. All chan^^es in nature, man and society have
causes, the necessary and sufficient conditions for their
occurrence. These causes can be located m the changes
and motions of the basic building blocks. Through the
isolation and observation of these building blocks one
can establish causal laws. In other words, one will
then be in a position to know what events lead to other
events and thus one can predict future events. These
basic aspects of the Hobbesian conception of science
are brought out in his discussion of the concepts of
reason, meniory, and science:
• •
•^G^son is not, as sense and memory, bornWith us nor gotten by experience only, asprudence is, but attained by industry: firstin apt iraposinr: of names, and secondly ingetting a good and orderly method in pro-
ceeding from the elements, which are names,
to assertions made by connection of one ofthem to another, and so to syllogisms, which
are the connection of one assertion to an-
other, till we come to a knowledge of all
the consequences of names appertaining to
the subject in hand; and that is it men
call science. .\nd whereas sense and memory
are but knowledge of fact, which is a thing
past and irrevocable, science is the know-
ledge of consequences and dependence of one
fact upon another, by which out of that we
can presently do v/e know hov^^ to do some-
thing else v/hen we will, or the like another
time; because when we see how anything comes
about, upon what causes and by what manner,
when the like causes come into our power we
see how to make it possible to produce the
like effocts.^^
^^P » cit
.
, Ilobbes, Leviathan
, p. ^9.
Ik
This view of science is nicely compatible with the
view of human nature sketched above. The belief that
every person is the locus of a set of p;iven passions,
passions which exist ref.:ardless of the social matrix,
suggests a mode of analysis which identifies these basic
building blocks and employs them to explain behavior, A vi
of science which is convinced that all reality consists of
isolable, irreducible building blocks will, in turn, tend
to reduce the human personality to a set of discrete parts
where one part moves the other in mechanistic fashion and
where the basic character of each is independent of the
others and of any possible interation with them.
The quest for laws of behavior both encourages and
is encouraged by a belief that the given passions determine
our observed action. The faith that human behavior is
similar to the movements of natural bodies and thus predict-
able justifies a belief in a determining agency and vice
versa.
Thus, in llobbes the conception of human nature and
the notion of science are closely related. The way in
which Hobbes tries to examine human behavior is not neutral
with respect to the view of the person he holds; it both
assumes and pushes him in the direction of a particular
view of human nature. And that connection leads one to
suspect that the metliod he aday^ts is less conducive to a
ew
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neutral test of the theory he espouses and more to an
imposition of that theory on "materials" which may or may
not themselves fit these expectations.
Moral Philosophy and Human Nature
The Hobbesian conception of man and science is also
related to the stance one takes toward the evaluation of
societies. The basic Hobbesian position is that questions
of the morality of a given social order are irrelevant.
This position has two related roots. In the first place
he believes that order is a precarious achievement—to
promote that is enough without worrying about higher
values. Order is both very necessary and very difficult
given the nature of man. People must be constantly re-
minded how close the human species is to disorder and
what the price to be paid for disorder is.
Secondly, such moral words as good and justice do
not constitute standards by which societies can be judged.
As we have noted, Hobbes asserts that the only meaning of
good is that to which a man aspires. Men call good that
to which they aspire. Nothing in things or reality itself
can bo called good. Along a similar line, justice is
defined in terms of the commands of the state. Anything
the state commands is ipso Incto just. Of course citizens
will often clain) an independent meaning for those terms,
16
but they are, according to llobbes, speaking nonsense and
openincr up the door to future disorder. There is thus no
meaningful standard by which the practices of any function-
ing political order may be judged except one: Does it
promote order? The task with which the social scientist
is left is to spell out in scientific or law-like terms
those conditions which preserve order.
What we have sketched in this discussion of Hobbes
and abstract individualism is really a coherent ideology.
A view of man is related to a conception of science and
moral judgment. If human beings are a-social creatures
of passion, rational moral standards become inappropriate
and one merely seeks scientific laws which spell out the
conditions of a minimal order. Avoiding talk of moral
standards clears the way for such scientific invest-
igation. A natural science conception of man pushes us
toward a deterministic psychology and the denial of any
independent role for moral reasoning.
That there is a similar set of related philosophical
assumptions in mainstream political science will be the
theme of the next chapter. Establishment of this theme
is made more difficult by the fact that contemporary
political scientists generally want to deny that they
proceed from any "untested" assumptions about man. Yet
as with Hobbes one can sec assumptions about man operating
17
in the ways they seek to explain human behavior as well
as in other general comments on the political scene.
18
Lenj
;s
C IJ A P T E R II
ABSTRACT INDIVIDUALISM AND MODERN SOCIAL SCIENCE
As I pointed out in the introduction, one probl<
with much of mainstream political science is that it
view of human nature is seldom clearly articulated and
the connection between its tacit assumptions about man
and the methods of social study are never appreciated.
This is an unfortunate state of affairs because the view
of human nature underlying the work is not subject to
systematic examination.
Yet in the work of such mainstream political scientists
as Robert Dahl we can find hints of a view of human nature,
and we can see that certain modes of explanation become
more plausible when we become aware of the underlying
assumptions about human nature. And finally, as with Ilobbes,
the view of man and of science is accompanied by a consistent
stance on moral discourse.
Dahl comes the closest to a direct statement on human
nature in a discussion of political participation in his
introductory text on the methods of political science,
Modern Political Analysis
. In the chapter on political
man he is concerned to oxplnin the lack of any widespread
and intense political involvement, except under exceptional
19
circumstances, in democratic political orders. During the
explanation he .akes the phenomenon see. both necessary
and predictable, and significantly, to sustain his point
of view he makes the following observation:
Just why political involvement is not morerewarding, for more people is a question ?orwhxch no Short or easy answer is possible!Ihe explanation, no doubt, turns on the
Itlloli^l "^"^ instinct a reasonable,reasoning?, civic-minded Deinfj. Many of hismost xrnperxous desires and the source of nmnyof hxs inost powerful gratifications can betiaced to ancxcnt and persistent biologicaland physiolof.ical drives, needs, and wants.Organized political life arrived late inman's evolution; today man learns how tobehave as a political man with the aid andoften with the hindrance of instinctive
equipment that is the product of a loneprior developii.ent. To avoid pain, discom-lort, and hunf^er, to satisfy drives for
sexual gratification, love, security, and
respect—these needs are insistent and
primordial. The means of satisfying themquickly and concretely generally lie out-
side political life.i
Dahl does not present here a pure variant of abstract
individualism. Yet he is convinced that much of the. most
significant behavior in organized societies is explained
by given biological drives. As we shall see, he also
holds that the way in which systems evolve depends upon
how and to what extent these given needs are met.
Robert A. Dahl, ?>iodern Political Analysis
, second ed.,(Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Uall
,
I969), p. 80,
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Human Nature and the Conception of Science in Dahl
.s
Dahl's approach to the study of societies reveal:
the connection between his conception of .an and the natur<
of science. Like Hobbes he breaks society down into a
number of component parts or systems, such as the polit-
ical system, social system, and economic systei.. And
like ilobbes he believes in the importance of using
precisely defined terms in order to study societies.
^
As in the case of most modern social scientists he
stresses the need to operationalize concepts. Concepts
must be defined so that they can be measured by a series
of empirical tests. The operational requirement of
mainstream political science is based on the Hobbesian
assumption that language is meaningful only when it
reflects the world out there.-'
The intent underlying this precise breakdown is to
find the laws governing the relationship among the systems
of society and the general laws of social development.
As in the case of Hobbes the laws sought are to be causal
bee for instance Dahl
'
s attenrpt to operationalize the
concepts of power and influence in Modern Politica l
Analysis
.
Ch. 5.
3An excellent critique of this position can be foundin Hannah Pitkin, Wit t /-.enst ein and Justice
.
(Berkeley:
University of Caliiornia Press, 1?72)
,
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laws—his search is for those antecedent factors which
invariably precede and produce particular sorts of change.
He is convinced that patterns of historical chan.^e are
recurrent and when the proper antecedent factors have
been identified particular changes can be predicted.
Thus such factors as the distribution of wealth, the rate
of economic growth, and the openness of formal political
access are seen as determining the pattern of influence
and degree of stability within the polity.'
Dahl and his peers would be the last to claim that
they have succeeded in creating a science of politics
having the elegance or precision of Newtonian physics.
but such an achievement remains the goal. In a discussion
of the conditions of underdevelopment and patterns of
change, Dahl makes some of the following remarks:
Because the path to the present that each
country has taJcen is in some degree unique,
every country has a somewhat different
legacy of conditions bearing on the chances
for polyarchy and peaceful adjustment. In
a sense much of the rest of this chapter is
an attempt to find patterns of explanation
in those richly different historical legacies.
The way in which political resources are
distributed among the people of a country
tends to viiry with its level of socio-
economic development. With some important
exceptions inequalities in the distribution
of political resources are greatest in
countries with agrarian societies, less
22
in industrial countries, and lea<^t -ir, ^
at the stage or high
.a^s-consS^^tion .
^""'^^^^
The generalization stated above is of course not a
law. Most Of the conclusions of modern political science
rernain at the level of probabilistic stateu^ents-the
precise concatenation of variables which determine a given
result has not yet been established, yet exact laws remain
the eventual goal,^ and philosophically the basic assump-
tion remains the proposition that causal patterns may be
determined. The only problem acknowledged is the practical
one of isolating all the relevant variables, for societies
are more complex but not different in kind from the
entities studied by the natural scientist.
Human Nature and Social Science in Concrete Problems
Some specific problems examined by Dahl show the
working of his method and its connection to an abstract
individualist conception of man. A favorite preoccu-
pation of social scientists during the late fifties and
k
QP« cit
.
.
Dahl, pp. 65 and 69.
5A critique of operationalism and the quest for laws
of political behavior analogous to those in natural science
can be found in yilliam E. Connolly, The Ternis of l^olitical
Discourse. (Lexington: D. C. Heath Co,, forthcoming)
.
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early sixties was to explain the stability of American
democracy. The pattern of explanation they used clearly
exemplifies the connection of their implicit conception
of human nature and their understanding of social science.
Dahl argues that conflicts within
.Vmerican society were
able to be fit within a broad framework of consensus and
willincness to compromise because l) the pattern of social
cleavages was cross-cutting, and 2) the size of the economic
pie was large and constantly grov/ing so that conflict
would tend to be focused on the distribution of increments.
No one was faced with the extreme pain of absolute loss.
These factors constituted a large part of the explanation
of stability and in turn generated a set of conclusions
about the factors which would have to be promoted to
insure pluralist stability in other lands,
A number of critical and very convenient assumptions
about human nature are being made in this analysis. These
assumptions are also found in much of the end of ideology
literature^ which became popular in the fifties and
early sixties. The argument is that the growth of a
large economic surplus will blunt ideological concerns
and make possible a politics of pragmatic compromise. The
^For a discussion of the themes In this literature see
M. Rejai, ed., Decline of Ideology
.
(New York: Atherton
Press, 1971),
2h
assumption is that human bein^rs have certain desires,
especially for material comforts, and that once these
are met the desire to participate in rational dialogue
about the ^joals of the political and economic system will
decline. This view posits the universality of certain
desires and uses them as a way of explaining social
chance. Also connected with this view are abstract
individualist assumptions about the relationship of
reason and passion. Reason is seen as playing essentially
an instrumental role. When confronted with the given
passions, here the desire for material comforts, reason
creates rationalizations about justice, ideologies to
justify the meeting of these desires or temporarily
soothe the ego for their lack of satisfaction.
That the task of reason in Dahl often is to create
rationalizations for given needs is also clear from his
treatment of authority and legitimacy. Dahl treats
authority as a specialized and more reliable form of
influence. It is one more tool which men in power will
strive to use. Leaders will fashion moral arguments in
order to make their rule seem more plausible. Reason
follows the tasks set for it by the underlying desires:
Authority is a highly efficient form of in-
fluence. It is not only more reliable and
durable than naked coercion, but it also
enables a ruler to govern with a minimum
25
to
It would be impossiblerely on foar and terror, for example, tocarry out the complex tasks of a large, modernbureaucratic organization such as the i
. TPost 01 lice ... or the public sc?,.ool systemof New York
. . .
When a subordinate rerardsthe orders and assir-ninent s he receives asmorally binding, only a relatively small ex-penditure of resources, usually in the form
ol salaries and wages, is necessary to ensure
satlslactory performance,'
Reason is regarded as an instrument which bends to the
given task. ,Vny argument which works is seen as giving
Its author legitimacy. Yet in our ordinary discourse v.e
distinguish between arguments which represent mere "man-
ipulation" and those which establish the legitimacy of
a given authority. Reason can serve as rationalization,
but it may also fashion generally accepted and acceptable
criteria which will shape the perception of needs within
the social system. As such it is in some sense a creator
of tasks and not merely a slave,
Dahl's view denies what the social view of man dis-
cussed in the next chapter affirms, that the concepts men
develop in their social lives help to constitute their
forms of interaction and that tliese may change in ways
which will leave men with new and even quite unpredictable
needs. The whole pattern of social development may change
as men come to have a new view ol the good life, and this
Op
. cit
.
, Dahl, p. ^tl.
View .a. „et
.e tr.ce.ble to Cannes i„
.o-oalle. u„ae.I^„,
...,„.3,
such as ecouoMic ^rcth. ,„at universal drives be so few, so
amorphous, and so full, shaped h, ^n-. social existence as to he
useless for predictive pu..poses is not considered. The individual-
istic vien of humn nature is convenient for Dahl because it allows hi,
to Plug in certain highly focused economic desires, posited as unl-
versals, and come out with general laws, a requirement of his
Philosophical method. He can conclude that economic growth has pro-
moted social peace because it meets certain universal desires,
desires which determi.ne the behavior of the person. The view of
hu^an nature and the quest for law-like regularities are fully
consistent with and reinforcing of each other. Without such a viev
of human nature one could not assign law like status to the general-
isations based on this evidence nor would one be seeking generalisa-
tions of a law-like form. As will be pointed out later in the
chapter, the generalizations sought within a social view will be gained
In other ways and will have a different status.
Not only Dahl's explanation of the stability of American
government but also his whole conception of the structure of our
society can be better understood in terms of his abstract Individualist
conception of himan nature. His approach to the distribution of power
reflects his atomistic perspective. On this matter his research
begins by choosing three controversial issue areas and then
deteraining who participates in the decisions. He shows
that different elites participate in each issue area and
concludes that no single power elite is responsible for •
policy in New Haven and that each irnportant group in the
urban area can have some impact on the policy questions
by which it is most affected.^
Bachrach and Baratz point out one way
. in which Dahl's
approach to the distribution of power is questionable.
Even if certain groups have clearly developed interests
they may be unable to find or construct the proper or-
ganizational mode by which these interests can be expressed
in the political system. ^ Yet the problem hero goes even
deeper and is best examined by a brief discussion of Dahl •
s
approach to the concepts of interest and power. Dahl tests
power by measuring one's ability to realize a stated pref-
erence. This view is close to the Hobbesian notion that
power is the ability to achieve some future apparent good.
Thus Dahl looks to his three controversial issue areas
in which the ability of the participants to realize
their stated preferences can be tested. Any stated
preference counts in the determination of who has power
8Kobert A. Dahl, Who Governs?
« {New Haven: Yale
University Press, I96I)
.
9Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, "Two Faces of
Power," American Political Science Review
, 56 (I962)
pp. 9Z17-932.
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as lone as preferences are not foreclosed by law or
intimidation JO Yet this view disregards the possibility
that power in its more subtle ramifications may include
the ability of an individual to shape the preferences of
the other, often through manipulation, in such a way that
the other fails to recognize or promote his own real
interests. The individual in other words may have stated
wants Which are not in his interest and his agreement with
those in pov.er may create a false consensus J ^
Dahl on the other hand assumes that people have given
wants which constitute their real interests. They know
these and can convert them into issues if these wants
are insufficiently met. Because he proceeds from an
individualist view of man and has an instrumental view
of reason he does not seo that the social patterns of
some lives may be such that they cannot clearly formulate
their demands and may not have even a clear sense of their
own needs. The presence of a false consensus need not
depend on our finding groups actually presenting coherent
ideas or demands. A person can become a full political
10These ideas are developed most clearly in Robert A.Dahl, "A Critique of the Uuling Elite Model," in G. WilliamDomhoff and Iloyt li. Ballard, eds
.
, C. \;rif^ht Mills and thePower Elite
,
(Boston: Beacon Press, lybB), pp. 25-36?
^^This critique is indebted to a lecture by Steven Lukes
on "Three Concepts of Power" at the University of Massa-
chusetts in the bpring of 1973 and to discussions of interes
and powei^ in Connolly, op. ci t
.
29
participant only when ho or she has had the opportunity to
develop a lan^a^o in which real needs can be expressed.
For many years won.en in our society have known that they
had problems-loneliness, frustrations in dealing with
children, a lack of fulfillment in their lives. Yet
before certain social developments and intellectual changes
occurred they could not see the connection of their prob-
lems to structures beyond their personal control. ""^
They saw their problems as personal problems, as conse-
quences of personal failings. It is an impoverished
social science which will deal only with clearly articu-
lated wants already expressed as public issues.
Dahl's failure to recognize the social construction
of needs and issues leads him to assert that most legit-
imate groups are represented in our political system.
lie sees different groups participating in each issue area
and concludes that most needs are being responded to
because there are different wants expressed in the polit-
ical process, and many groups are apathetic on most
issues. Their interests must not be affected for un-
fulfilled basic desires always lead to demands on the
12For a fuller discussion of the relationship of issues
and personal troubles see C. Wright Mills, The Sociological
Imagination
.
(London: Oxford University Press. 1959)
pp. 8-13.
13Robert A. Dahl, Prefctce to Democratic Theory
, (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, I950), Ch. 5.
system.
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DahLs troatmont of apathy „,akos ev,n clearer th«
ato.,i»tlc «n<ier„l„„in,, or hla approach. „e ar,;uc.. that
in Western de.„ocraci,s apathy should be the expected nor,„
and political participation the phenomenon which needs
oxplaininf^
:
act^vi.r''"^
of most men's lives are primaryi ties anvolvaru: Tood, sex, lovu
,
family,work play, shelter, comfort, friendship.
^'
social esteem, and the like. Activitieslike those—not politics—are the primary
concerns of most men and women.
. .It
would clear the air of a f^ood deal of cant
11 instead of assuminfv that politics is a
normal and natural concern of hmium beinrs
.
one wore to make the contrary assumption '
*
that lip service citizens may pay to
conventional attitudes, politics is a remote,
alien, and unrewarding: activity. Instead
of seekinr: to explain why citizens are notinterested, concerned, and active, the. taskis to explain why a J ew citizens are . ^
Once again Dahl assumes that people have certain given
drives which are determinants of their actions. lie does
not consider the possibility that w© have created the kind
of society whicli leads men and women to find the satis-
factions of politics unrewarding;.
Ho believes that the interaction of competing elites
in a democracy fulfills the basic desires of the people
and so they will have no wish to get actively involved in
Op* c i t
.
.
Dahl, V.'ho Governs
« p, 279,
politics. Li,.e Jan,os Mill he is in offset tr.atinc polit-
ical participation in terms of opportunity costs. ^5
time one expends In politics is painful and if one does
not derive fro™ it n.cre than an equivalent amount of
payoff the participation isn't worth it. If elected
leaders and leaders of interest «roups are delivering
enough goods regularly then it doesn-t ^ake sense to
participate
.
It is interesting to note that even in a recent work
Where Dahl seeks to respond to such critics as Jack V/alker,
vho has decried the lack of concern for participation in
Dahl.s work,!^ the criteria used to defend participation
are clearly still tied to an individualist view of human
nature and limit the possible range and efficacy of parti-
cipation. Dahl arguos that participation may be a way to
get What one wants, but he does not discuss the possibility
that it may change and improve us as people. His criteria
for authority are personal choice, competence, and economy.
For a discussion of James Mill's conception of democ-racy and representation and his use of opportunity costssee Alan Ryan, "Two Concepts of Politics and Democracy:James and John Stuart Mill" in Martin Fleisher, edMachiavelli and the Nature of Political Theory
. (New York-Atheneum, 1972), pp. 76-113. ^
"•^Jack L. V;falker, "A Critique of the Elitist Theory ofDemocracy," American Political Scienc e Review-. 60 (1966)
pp. 283-295. ^ ^
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The criterion of personal choice legitiiuates a decision
when one has the chance to pursue his rational self-interest
provided others have an equal chance. The criterion of
competence legitimates a decision if it is made by a
person who is particularly qualified by some skill. The
criterion of economy requires that the cains of partici-
pation outweiGh the opportunity cost of time lost from
other pursuits.'''' In many circumstances these criteria
will conflict with each other and applying them to par-
ticular areas will require a delicate balancing act. Yet
the very possibility that participation in the right set-
ting may change and improve us, thus altering our very
needs, makes it impossible to apply such a balancing act
to questions of expanding participation. Dahl • s commit-
ment to an individualistic view of human nature becomes
clear in the kind of cost-benefit analysis of participation
which pervades his discussion of the economy criterion.
Thus Dahl declares that "if the rewards do not exceed
the costs, it is looliiih of you to participate at all."
He further remarks that "the more likely it is that by
participating you will change the outcome in the direction
of your personal choice," the more attractive is partic-
1
8
ipation. This view becomes problematic in ways Dahl
1
7
Robert A. Dahl, After the devolution
.
(New Haven:
Yale University Press, I97I)
, Ch, 1.
18Ibid., p. 46.
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does not consider if we entertain the possibility that
participation itself may chan^^e and broaden one's own
sense of his needs and wants. Dahl • s view is most con-
genial only when we assume the permanence of stated needs,
as does an abstract individualist conception of manj^
Dahl does believe that sooie kinds of economic enterprise
are suitable for direct participation
, in terms of his
three criteria, but if he reco^?nized the intrinsic good
of participation he would be more concerned with increasing
the number of social spaces in which direct participation
would bo possible,
Dahl's view of man leads him to neglect the possibility
that in some social structures one's sense of himself and
of a worthwhile life may involve participation with
others in an effort to define the common good. Participation
may itself create such a sense of need within the individual.
He may come to find this life more fulfilling than an
existence devoted to purely private acquisitiveness.
Highly individualistic calculations of the loss of time
and money may come to have only minimal relevance. Dahl
does not consider that the great relevance of these
19See a discussion of Dahl's conception of participation
in Peter Bachrach, "Interest, Participation, and Demo-
cratic Theory," (Unpublished paper).
20Op« cit
.
,
Dahl, After the Kevolution, Ch. 3.
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considerations in our culture may in fact tell us something,
about our contemporary social system. Once a^ain he tries
to turn these connections and relationships into general
laws. He doesn't consider that we may have created men
who carry with them a Benthamite calculus, thouf^h I would
argue that even these men are not pure Benthamites and
could not be if we are to have any society at all.
The picture of American democracy which emerges from
all this is one which neatly integrates Dahl's assumptions
about a deterministic social science and his rather in-
dividualistic anthropology. lie pictures the political
system as one where groups continually feed Interests,
wants, into the political process and politicians com-
promise these inputs in such a way that everyone doesn't
get all he wants but does get enough to make him happy.
The political system works with the causal efficiency
of the Newtonian universe. One can predict that new
groups with new demands will be handled in the same
pluralist fashion. If their demands are the sort that
can be processed by the system, they can eventually achieve
access and some of the valued goods.
Orthodox pluralists like Dahl find it hard to rec-
ognize that substantial groups within a culture may corae
to question the validity of tlje whole pluralist picture
of society with its j^revalent image of man as bargaine?'.
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The atomistic view of man and the causal, law-like view
of science makes them unable to consider the possibility
that societies are communities constituted in part by
their own self-conceptions and that those conceptions
are subject to change often in unpredictable ways.
Pluralists have absolutized one moment in time and
converted it into a social law. And pluralism itself
functions as a theoretical system which has helped to
create the identity it clairas to describe. It has
contributed a moral defense of the status quo while
claiming to be only scientific and thus value neutral.
I will say more about this when I discuss concepts of
human nature and the moral stance one takes toward
various communities.
Dahl's Moral Stance
In Dahl's case we see that the conception of science
along with the picture of American democracy are sustained
by an atomistic view of man. In addition he believes that
he cannot rationally defend moral statements. The paradox
is that though his work does lend moral support to our
society, support unacknowledged by Dahl, and though Dahl
2 1 Analyses of the limitations of pluralist thought may
be found in V^llliam E. Connolly, ed. The J3ias of Pluralism
.
(New York: Athorton Press, 19(^9) and in i(obert l-'aul Wolff,
The Poverty of LibGr:rlism
.
(Boston: Beacon Press, I968).
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declares that he has a „,oral preference for democracy.
his view or „,oral discourse does not allow him to see
the v,ays in which his ,„oral co„„„itn,ents and scheme of
explanation each reinforce the other. He is thus not
in a position to scrutinize critically important connections
Implicit in his own work.^^
Dahl basically shares with his classic predecessor
a noncor^nitivist theory of ethics, While he does not
maintain that ethical terms are meaningless, he does not
believe that any empiric.l foundation can be found for
applying an ethical term to any given institution. His
position is that the realm of fact ^.nd the realm of
values are logically separate. The possibility that
our values might influence our empirical research is one
to be steadily guarded against. The development of an
adequate science of politics depends upon sustaining this
dichotomy:
So too, the Empirical Theorist would argue,
22 ^For a discussion of the problems and possibilities
here see U'illiam E. Connolly, "Theoretical belf-Con-
sciousness" in William E. Connolly and Glen Gordon, eds.,
Soci'* 3 btructuro ..nd i-oliticra ^Dieory
, (Lexington: D. C.
Heath and Co., 197^0 » PP - ^0-o6.
23A discussion and critique of the noncognitivis
t
theory of ctliics may be found in Mary l/arnock, ]':thics
Since 1900
,
(London: Oxford University Press, i960)
and Alasdair Macintyro, A Short History of Ethics,
(New York: MacMillan and Co., i960)
.
the truth or falsity of empirical propo-sitions about politics does not lo^;icallydepend on what we think ou^ht to be butwhat in fact is. And no matter what thatfamous emperor thought or protended tothink, as he paraded before his subjectshe was not wearing any clo thes ! -^'-^ *
Thus the working social scientist can only unearth
the facts and establish correlations among them. This
view fits nicely with the belief that human beings act
out of given urges and behave inevitably in certain
predictable ways. The realm of reason reflects the
given instincts and does not alter the nature of social
interaction. The same total ideology operative in llobbes
Is present also in the work of Dahl,
In the course of these first U-^o chapters a number of
Important philosophical terms and issues have come up,
such as causal laws and the separation of reason and
emotion. The full significance as well as the inadequacie
of the views summarized here can be made clear only after
examining the contrasting social view of hum^^n nature
espoused so clearly by Rousseau. We shall find that this
view suggests a different conception of the study of
society and opens up potentially far deeper criticisms
of our society than can be developed within an atomistic
0P» cit
.
.
Dahl, Modern Political Analysis
. first ed.,
p. 103.
understanding of ,„„„. The ro.nalnder of thl« thesis will
bo conoernod „ith dolineutin,: a social view of „,a„ and it,
implications and with the defense of this view.
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C 11 A P T E R III
ROUSSEAU AND TIIE SOCIAL CONCEPTION OF MAN
A careful analysis of Kousseau's IDiscourse on the
^"^^^^"^ ^ Inequality illuminates the difference betxvoen
his social and developmental conception of hunian nature
and an atomistic understanding of man. To becor.ie clear
about Rousseau's views and about the ways in which later
social views of man are deeply indebted to him it is
necessary to consider specifically his conception of
the relationship between reason and passion and his
understanding of the nature of morality before society
exists. Perhaps the best way into these issues is to
contrast Hobbes and Rousseau with reference to the changes
society makes on natural man.
To Rousseau society has a radical effect on man's
nature whereas Ilobbes assumes that society leaves in tact
and merely reinforces the basic human instincts. Though
Rousseau has often been falsely accused of bein.j a
primitivist who wanted to see a return to an uncivilized
state of nature,^ ho in fact attributed a major role to
^See Ernst Cassirer, Rousseau
, Kant , and Goethe
,(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 19^5 ) for a
discussion and critique of this view.
ko
society in the developn^ent of persons. He did not regard
it as a mere auxiliary outgrowth of certain preformed
drives. Society basically alters the nature of man. And
to Rousseau the principal alteration is that it makes us
social beings. Even those acts which we call egoistic
have to be understood in a way different from Hobbes's
conception of them. But before we can discuss these
questions adequately, some preparatory ground must be
covered first.
In the introduction to the Second Discourse
. Rousseau
remarks that the task of unearthing real human nature is
extremely difficult because man has been so greatly altered
by society. It is liard for us even to imagine what man
is like outside society and consequently many authors
project onto an original human nature tendencies they
observe in their own societies.
The human soul, like the statue of Glaucus
which time, the sea and storms had so much
disfigured that it resembled a wild beast
more than a god, the human soul, I say,
altered in society by the perpetual succes-
sion of a thousand causes, by the acquisition
of numberless discoveries and errors, by the
changes that have happened in the constitu-
tion of the body, by tl.e perpetual jarring
of the passions, has in a manner so changed
in appearance^i^s to be scarcely dis-
tinguishable.
2
'Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Discourse on the Origin of
Inequality
.
Lester G. Crocker^ cd.
,
("New York: j.ashington
Square Press, I967), p. I67.
^1
To sec how .uch ve have been tran.for.ned by society, it is
necessary Tor us to perrorn. an act of imagination which
Will allow us to thinl. about .an in his pre-social state.
IX. this condition Housseau imagines rwan had (or would
have) only two very
.generalized instincts, self-preservation
and pity. But .nan in the state of nature is not evil nor
Is life in the state of nature a war of all against all.
In his pre-social state .nan acts out of momentary needs.
He will kill animals or pick fruit as he is hungry, but
he has no forethou^.ht about future needs because he cannot
think. He has no concept of future and no concept of mine
and yours. These are all social concepts. They depend
on a rudimentary society and the development of lan^ua^e
.
The philosophers, who have examined thefoundations of society, have all perceivedthe necessity of tracing? it back to a state
of nature, but not one of them has ever gotthere. Some of them have not scrupled to
attribute to man in that state the ideas ofjustice and injustice, without troubling;
themselves to prove that he really i.iust havehad such ideas, or even that such ideas were
useful to him: otliers have spoken of tlie
natural ri^^ht of every v.iau to keep what
belon.^s to him, without lottin/r us Icnow
what they meant by the word bolonrr ; others,
without furtlier ceremony ascribing; to the
stron/joot an authoiity over the weakest,
have immediately brought /rovornmejit into
bein/f, without thinkin/^ of the time requi-
site for men to form any notion of the thinrra
si/jnified by the words authority and ,';ov-
ornment. All of thorn, in fine, constantly
harpin^C on wants, avidity, opprcsi.ion,
desires and pride, have transferred to the
k2
state of nature ideas picked up in the bosoof society. In speakinjij of savages thevdescribed citizens.
3
ni
Before the existence of settled society it thus makes no
sense. to speak of man as having evil instincts. Before
society there can be brief conflict if two hungry men
converge on a rabbit, but there is no war because grudges
and revenge are out of place when there is no concept of
past wrongs or even of person for that matter. In the
pure state of nature man runs when he is afraid and he is
always satisfied when his momentary instincts are met. The
sort of man Ilobbes describes is really a civilized man
developed within and adapting to a particular form of
society.
But eventually a number of historic accidents combine
to produce society and transform man. As the population
increases men interact more frequently and rudimentary
societies begin to emerge. The growth of society means
the development of institutions and language. liousseau
has a stronr: sense of the centrality of language, and such
modern philosophers as Wittgenstein and Vinch echo his
analysis on this point. Rousseau sees language and social
institutions as complexly interv^oven. It is hard, he says,
•^Ibid.
, p. 176.
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to imat-ine n,on abl. to interact regularly without languace
and yot it is hard to imagine the growth of language before
society exists.
The first (difficulty) that offers itself ishow languaf-es could become necessary; for
as there was no correspondence between men
nor the least necessity for any, there is noconceiving the necessity of this invention,
nor the possibility of it, if it was notindispensable. I mif^ht say, with many others,that languae;e3 are the fruit of the domesticintercourse between fathers, mothers, and
children: but this, besides its not answer-ing the difficulties, >yould be committin^^
the same error as those, who reasoning on
the state of nature, transfer to it ideas
gathered in society, always consider families
as livin^^ together under one roof, and their
members as observing among themselves a union,
equally intir.jate and permanent as that which
exists among us, where so many common interests
unite thera;^
Somehow th© two grow together, and Rousseau implies that
no neat temporal priority or causal connection can be
established here. The relationship between language
and thought is analogously complex. V/e cannot imagine
th© creation of language except by men who can think,
but conversely one cannot conceive of complex thought
apart from language
•
Rousseau obviously stands in awe of the complex and
basic relationship of language to human life as we know
it. The relationship between language and human develop-
ment is crucial. Language is crucial to institutional
life by relating men to each other in systematic ways.
Ibid,
, pp, 192-193.
Th« roles we play are constituted by the general abstract
system of language. He strongly disagrees with the
Hobbesian notion that language merely describes a prcv-
iously existing reality. Once language and institutions
exist, the basic nature of man is changed. These changes
have good and bad aspects.
In the first place, with the growth of language and
institutions, it now makes sense to speak of right and
wrong ways of doing things as well as of moral right and
wrong in general. Rousseau argues that we are transformed
by society into moral beings, and he nieans this in a
radiccil sense. His contemporary, David Hume, had argued
that society malces us raorel, but to Hume morality is a
set of rules of efficiency. Social experience teaches us
what helps or hurts. ^ To Rousseau the growth of society
makes us moral by giving us wants and needs we would not
otherwise have. Vo come to prize a given set of relation-
ships because part of our identity is tied up in these
institutional relationships. We are not beings simply
of self-interest. Thus the "family man" makes sacrifices
for his family not simply because it is a source of plea-
sure to him but because he comes to regard himself as a
5John Plaraenatz, Man and Society
,
Vol. I, (Nev 4->rk:
McGraw Hill Book Co., I963}, Ch. 10,
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family man and to know that h« is so regarded by those
in his family and community. It may then result that he
feels a kind of happiness from his fulfillment of the rol
but he does not act for the sake of that pleasure.
Implicit in this discussion is a rejection of tho
abstract individualist's view of the relationship between
reason and passion. In the Hobbesian tradition reason is
instrumental. Its role is to find satisfactory outlets
for the gratification of the passions. In the often
quoted though somewhat ambiguous phrase of Hume, reason i
and ever ought to be the sl^lve of the passions. But once
we say that the development of concepts and institutions
gives a person a new identity we can no longer take so
simplistic a view, for we are really arguing that reason
itself helps mold the passions and thus that the con-
ceptual development occuring in a given society will have
much to do with tho nature of the passions prevailing
there. There is a complicated interdependency which
cannot be expressed in simple causal terms. As Alasdair
Maclntyre remarks, a passion is not just what it is as a
toothache is what it is whether you or I think about it.
Our thoughts about the passions, the v/ay we break up the
world conceptually, affect the nature of them as "passion:
We have a scheme for interpreting our emotions and our
nie
.eve
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conception of these emotions depends on this scheme/
^.'hen 1 fool gratitude toward you I am not auton^at ically
responding to some inner physiological state within
to x.hich I always attach the word gratitude. I bel^
you have intentionally done ,ne son.o good for which I had
no call on you. My feeling of gratitude may be associated
with a "warm feeling,., but that feeling will be understood
and in part constituted by my recognition of our total
relationship and thus my comprehension of a number of
related concepts and actions.
Rousseau explicitly rejects a neat separation of
reason and passion when he declares that each is greatly
indebted to the other.
Let moralists say what they will the human
understanding is greatly indebted to thepassions, which, on their side, are like-
wise universally allowed to be greatlyindebted to the human understanding. Itis by the activity of our passions, that
our reason improves; we covet knowledge
merely because we covet enjoyment, and
it is impossible to conceive, why a man
exempt from fears and desires should take
the trouble to reason. The passions, in
their turn, oAve their origin to our needs,
and their increase to our progress in
science; for we cannot desire or fear
anything, but in consequence of the ideas
we have of it, or of the simple impulses
of nature ;
'
Alasdair Maclntyre, "Reason and Passion: The Modern
Tradition," (Unpublished paper).
Op* cit
.
« rtousseau, pp. I88-I89.
^7
He also makes it clear that needs are socially created.
These social needs may bear sopjc relationship to the
original given instincts, but they are so altered and
expanded by society as to be virtually new.
This appears to me as clear as daylight,
and I cannot conceive whence our phil-
*
osophers can derive all the passions they
attribute to natural man. Except the barephysical necessities, which nature herself
requires, all our other needs are merely
the effect of habit, before which they were
not needs, or of our cravings; and we don't
crave that which we arc not in a condition
to know. Hence it follows that as savage
man longs for nothing but Avhat he knows,
and knows nothing but what he actually
possesses or can easily acquire, nothing
can be so caln as his^soul, or so confined
as his understanding,*^
Human beings are not, then, prisoners of fixed in-
stincts whose reason is tied to the task of finding out-
lets for these instincts. They are beings with a con-
ceptual and institutional past who cannot throw off
concern for their moral responsibilities. ^Vnd they are
both descendants and creators of this past.
So much of man's identity is created by his presence
in society that there is no turning back. Just as it is
almost impossible to imagine what man was originally like,
so it is inconceivable that man could completely repudiate
Ibid.
. p. 254.
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the social nature of his existence. Thus despite the fact
that some commentators persist in seeing hin, as a prim-
itivist, Housseau explicitly rejects the idea that wo can
ever go back to a happier state of nature. There is no
return to the Garden of Eden, which in any case to Rousse
was not idyllic because it lacked a sense of good and evil.
Rousseau does believe that much of the history which
creates us has been unfortunate. Thus through a historical
accident property was invented and with property came
Inequality. Inequality produced in some men the need to
dominate, and it made all men insecure. It led to pro-
longed and violent conflict. He agrees with Hobbes that
human life under some circumstances can be a war of all
against all, but these are "civilized" beings who carry
on the war. They are creatures of the institution of
property and the moral code and sense of identity which
property creates. But paradoxically some moral codes
limit the range of human awareness and thus blunt the
full development of man's potential,
Basic to llousseau's thought is the view that some
passions are better than others. Some forms of social
structure create passions A^'hich bring men closer to-
gether and create a more harmonious society. Men can
coiiibine independence and a sense of responsibility to and
for others. Though Ftousseau believes that society creates
-sni
1X3
49
needs, he docs not push this toward a cultural relativii
which sanctions all forms of society. But because hi
historical sense is so strong he is not one to push for
rapid, radical changes. Stfindards by which to judge and •
direct the course of historical change are however rele-
vant and ,nay be derived from man's capacity for rationality
and moral growth. Though every society has its ongoing
institutions and moral codes, there are certain universal
moral parameters which may be applied to all societies
and these parameters contain the only adequate justif-
ication for the loss of man » s natural independence. I
will return to this topic when I discuss the relationship
a social conception of human nature and the evaluation of
societies. At that juncture an examination of the Social
Contract will be in order.
Men can apply moral judgments even to their own
societies because, while children of history, they are
not trapped by history. As conceptual beings we are
aware of the right way to do things, but because we
create these concepts we can also bring about change.
Concepts are constantly being altered as we seek to apply
them to new situations and consider new Information. Thus
w© need not remain trapped in established ways of doing
things as would mere stimulus-response beings: • .the
boast cannot deviate from the rules that have been pre-
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scribed to it, even in cases where such deviation might
be useful, and man ofton deviates Irom the rules laid
down for him tho his prejudice, As we shall see. such
modern philosophers as Winch have drawn heavily on the
Insifrhts implicit in this remark.
Philosophical Arpunients between Ilobbes and Rousseau
The conception of man as a social beine, one Avhose
emotions are in part constituted by his social environment
and whose actions are not to be treated in mechanistic
causal fashion, is buttressed by a number of important
philosophical arguments. These involve a discussion of
some of the important differences between Ilobbes and
Rousseau
,
Hobbes has frequently been criticized for deempha-
sizing the extent to which social institutions apart
from the formal political system are a source of order
in society. While accepting this criticism, I think it
is possible to ^o even deeper and show that the Hobbesian
notion of sovereicnty is really an outgrowth of an in-
adequate view of morality and moral concepts. And the
lack of an adequate moral and social perspective on human
9 Ibid. , p. 186.
nature leads to certain crucial incoherences in Hobbes
thought. These suggest problems with any atten.pt to hold
consistently to such an atomistic view of man.
As has been pointed out, the Hobbesian view of human
nature is e^^oistic and deterministic. Human beings are
creatures of emotion driven by fixed, permanent needs.
Power is a means to achieve future emotional gratification
and human reason is merely instrumental. These charac-
teristics are not altered by the inception of the social
contract, which is itself an instrument of hedonic egoism.
The Hobbesian conception of moral discourse is an out-
growth of these premises, and this conception is present
in modern positivism and thus in much contemporary political
science, though its ancestry and full philosophical basis
is neither recognized nor admitted. Hobbes declares
that what we call good, in other words the meaning of
this moral concept, is that which satisfies an immediate
private pleasure.
It follows from the Hobbesian conception of man that
the justification of sovereignty is its preservation of
order—all we may reasonably expect of any functioning
state is that it preserve order. If we ask more and
demand justice society easily reverts to anarchy. Hobbes
is able to make such an assumption because he does not
have a satisfactory theory of moral development. He
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assumes that within society men continue to interact in an
external, manipulative, deterministic way--other men are
only potential instruments of my pleasure and so I will
manipulate them in accordance with the goals determined '
for me by my passions. Now one would be foolish to deny
that this is an accurate picture of some aspects of re-
lationships Within society, but it is extremely problematic
to draw this as a picture of every aspect of all human
relationships.
The Rousseauian argument that human nature is changed
significantly in society is buttressed by a close look at
language itself. Ve have a whole vocabulary which reflects
the fact that we regard other human beings as conscious
freely choosing moral agents. Wo say that we resent x's
behavior only when we attribute intention to him. We do
not resent a rock falling off a cliff and damaging our car.
In society we enter into a whole series of relationships
where w© cease to treat other persons as objects. V/e
would find it very difficult if not impossible to get along
without the moral vocabulary of resentment, love, obligation
Once one understands how elements of choice are built into
our most vital human relationships, conventional determinist
10
P. F. Strawson, "Freedom and Resentment," in P. F.
Strawson, od., studios in the I'hilosophy of Thought and
Action, (New York: Oxford University Press, 19ob77
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these which view our actions and ideas as controlled by
given passions become hard to sustain. m fact the
understanding of another person as a consciously choosing
agent and the recognition that he sees us as such is an
important part of what we know as human existence.
Because the concept of eruilt is so integrally related
to our moral and social life, a close examination of this
concept can provide additional support for the inter-
dependent arguments I have been making about the social
nature of man and the inability to separate neatly reason
and passion. As John Rawls points out,^^ guilt is a complex
concept which involves ideas we develop in our social
relationships with others. In the first place the concept
Is related to other concepts such as right, fairness,
obligation. If we did not have these other concepts
and the kind of social practices with which they are
interwoven we could not speak of guilt as we know it.
Secondly the concept of guilt is susceptible to varying
degrees of complexity as one develops within a society.
Thus in a situation where a pex^son has been taught to
love, obey, and trust a figure in authority who treats
one well, he will feel what Rawls calls authority guilt
^^John Rawls, "The Sense of Justice," Review of Phil-
osophy
. 72 (1963).
5^
when he violates the injunctionn of the authority. But
as an individual develops in society, learning, new and
broader roles, a more complex concept of r.uilt will be
developed
•
If we imafrine a /rroup of individuals involved in a
cooperative enterprise the rules guidin^j which are fair
and known to be fair, the individuals involved will
develop a sense of trust and friendship. Through joint
participation in the activity they become closely bound
to their follows. They see them intentionally living up
to the rules of the game and develop a sense of respon-
sibility to the others. If in this situation an individual
violates the rules of the game, he will feel guilt, a
feeling which will manifest itself in several ways, in-
cluding an inclination to make good the loss to others
and to accept the penalties. The individual who avoids
actions which make him foci guilty thus is not responding
to some simple inner physiological state. His feelings
grow out of his complex understanding of the world
embodied in his concepts and social institutions.
Language and the social roles with which it is
connected make possible the development of a state of
reciprocal consciousness among human beings. I know
that a given task is part of my role and the otlier
person knows that I know. The value of this typo of
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experience lies in a state of consciousness between two
human beings; it does not nmke reference to a state
of feeling of one isolated being, as in the conventional
instances of egoism or altruisn,. The growth of a whole
set of institutional ties among people creates a large
possible set of reciprocal relationships and fundamentally
changes the nature of man. It makes us moral beings be-
cause our mere existence now as social, rational beings
implies a whole new set of responsibilities. We can evade
these but we cannot be fully unconscious of them because
they arc now a large part of our identity.
These considerations about the nature of language
constitute no final proof of the invalidity of an atomistic
and deterministic view of man. But if human bein-s really
are the causally controlled atoms of Hobbes and much of
contemporary social science, beings driven by innate
passions, one will have an enormous problem explaining
the existence and subtle nuances of some of the most
Important ideas in our vocabulary, ideas we could hardly
imagine getting along without.
I would ar,']rue that the whole vocabulary of good and
evil grows out of social existence and reflects our per-
12Robert Paul i/olff , The Poverty of Liberalism
.
Ch. 5.
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ception of others as conscious agents and our realization
that we arc siinilarly perceived. This comrmnal life is
the source of our humanity and our moral concepts are
airbed, at preservi^.^ that coinniunity. Moral concepts are
aimed at furthering
..y interest only if by interest we nu.an
not niy private egoistic pleasure but the full human devel-
opment which community life makes possible.
Conclusion
Rousseau thus presents a thoroughgoing attack on all
the basic postulates of abstract individualism. Passions
arc not simple given entities; rather our needs develop
in society. They are complex and changing. Nor can we
speak of them as determining behavior in any simple way.
The rational dialogue occurring within society has an
impact on these and so a neat separation of reason and
passion must be rejected. The individual contributes
to this dialogue and so, as we shall see, law-like
treatment of human behavior after the fashion of natural
science is not appropriate.
I have shown that tliere are solid philosophical
reasons to support this view of man. This conception
carries with it important consequences both for how we
study society and how we evaluate it. Some modern
philosophers are indebted to a Housseauian conception
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of n.an in thoir effort to suggest so.ne of the limitations
of conten^porary niethods in the social sciences. In the
next chapter I will show that Peter Uinch, one of the
leading critics of a natural science approach to society,
does proceed fron assumptions on human nature close to
Rousseau's. Then I will discuss sorne aspects of the
method of social science he advocates. In the process I
will advance son^e reasons for accepting such a conception
of social science.
Before I can finish discussion of a social conception
of man something raust be said about the moral stance which
it generates. Thus far I have only alluded to this issue.
Because there are differences between Rousseau and V/inch
on this very important issue and because both differ from
the modern noncognitivist theory of ethics, I will devote
all of chapter five to these questions. I will argue that
the recognition that human bein-s are in part constituted
by their societies need not end in the relativistic
assertion that all societies are equally good.
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CHAPTER IV
SOCIAL SCIENCE
.U\D THE SOCIAL CONCEPTION OF MAN
The social and moral view of man espoused first so
clearly by Rousseau underlies much of the current philo-
sophical attack on positivism. The close relationship
of concepts and action, the refusal to accept a simple
dichotomy of reason and passion, the rejection of neat
causal mechanism in the explanation of human action have
all been important in this attack on positivism. Peter
Winch, drawing on the later work of V/itteonstein, has
played a significant part in this attack. His work
suggests that a view of man and of social science have
helped to sustain each other, with dubious consequences
for each. It is necessary to examine the work of Winch
in detail because he applies important arguments char-
acteristic of Rousseau to certain modern philosophical
problems as well as to contemporary social science.
The view of human nature held by Winch comes through
in his discussion of two topics which he considers to be
closely interdependent. He begins The Idea of a Social
Science with an analysis of the nature of philosophy,
epistomology in particular. His initial polemical target
is the "undcrlaborer" conception of philosophy. This
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conception hold, that the task of philosophy is to deal
with problen,3 that co.ne to it fro. other areas. Philosophy
can toll us nothing about the world; that is the job of
science. Philosophy deals with linguistic confusions
Which may develop in the course of science. Its real task
is to sharpen the tools with which to examine the world.
The underlaborer conception of philosophy rejects the
assumption that philosophy is an autonomous enterprise.
Winch objects to this conception, which he sees as
being dominant within the field, because it assumes right
from the start a sharp distinction between the world
and the language with which we try to describe the world.
He denies that it can make sense to speak of an indepen-
dent social reality which exists apart from the concepts
we use to comprehend it. Philosophy is concerned with
the relationship between language and reality and thus
with the nature of reality. It is an autonomous discipline
which cannot be limited to problems brought to it from
without .
^
The fields of metaphysics and episteraology
, which
have always been the special preserve of philosophy,
therefore come in for close attention from Winch, If the
philosophy of natural science is concerned with the
criteria of intelligibility in the natural sciences.
Peter Winch, The Idea of a Socia l Science and Its "
Relation to Philosophy
« (Tendon: Uout ledge and Kegan
Paul, 19587, Ch. i.
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epistemolocy is concerned with the criteria of intelli-
gibility as such. This leads Winch into a discussion of
what it is for a word to have meaning. How do I know that
two objects with which I write are both instances of the
same thing, pen? It is only by following the rules built
into the concept pen that I can derive the criteria which
allow me to make this judgment. Built into or constituting
our concepts are rules which allow us to apply thera to
various situations.
If we are to understand V.'inch's view of human action
and thus his conception of human nature, it is necessary
to follow his discussion of rules. Me say that x is
following a rule only if we could in principle discover
the rule he is following. Rules are public in the sense
that they can become clear to others in a social context.
Related to this condition is the requirement that if one
is following a rule it must be logically possible for
him to make a mistake. If any possible action is con-
* '
'
gruent with x's following a "rule" we would not want to
say that ho was following a rule. The notion of mistake
again is vital because it pcdnts rule following in the
direction of a social context. By mistake we mean that
an action is recognizably in contravention of established
ways of doing something. We cannot speak of a mistake
^Ibid., pp. 30-32.
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unless we can speak of the possibility that oth«r people
will point out ray action as a mistake. Otherwise I may
continue to apply the "rule" as I like and there is no
external chock on me. The rule does not serve as any
limit to niy behavior. This does not n.ean that all
violations of rules must be spotted for us to say that
the rules exist. It means that the concept of rule makes
no sense apart from a social context, public criteria
and the possibility of checks for mistalces. This dis-
cussion of intelligibility and rule following is impor-
tant because Winch has, through an analysis of the nature
of language, related both lan^juage and action to a social
context. His philosophical analysis sustains and reflects
an assumption Rousseau shares; that we need society for
language and that the growth of society itself depends
upon the existence of language.
Winch's method in approaching this subject is fully
consonant with the substantive conclusions he is defending.
Aftei" a discussion of the meaningfulness of language
which has moved toward society, he then moves touard human
action itself, a concept which once again leads him back
to language and society.
A central distinction underlying Winch's examination
-^Ibid.
,
Ch. 2.
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of the concept of human action is the contrast between a
happening and human action. If a tennis ball strikes my
head and I fall to the ^^round this is exactly what happens
to me; but if in the middle of the match I go to my ki.ees
in a particular posture, to "beg for mercy," this is a
meaningful action different in kind from the happening.
The action is symbolic in that it goes together with other
actions in such a way as to commit me to behaving in one
way rather than another. And I am committed in the future
by what I do now if my present act is the application of
a rule. Human action is rule governed and therefore related
to a social context. In other words actions can have
meaning only if they are rule governed and thus express
the concepts which help both to describe and constitute
the various forms of human interaction. We cannot speak
of the actions of taking the marriage vow apart from
the concepts and rules which constitute this practice.
The practice does not soraehow exist and then social
scientists come along to invent a vocabulary to describe
it. Human actions differ from happenings in that the
former are intrinsically related to the concepts which
describe and constitute them.
Implicit in the whole discussion of the relationship
of language to reality is the notion which V/inch inherits
from Rousseau and his tradition that society fundamentally
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Changes hu.an nature. The importance of the social context
in human action comes through in an essay in which Winch
defends certain basic aspects of Uousseau's conception
of human nature a^^ainst llobbes. V/inch remarks:
"V.'here
Hobbes thinks that the citizen must be taught what man's
nature unchangeably is, Rousseau's view is that a man's
nature is created by his education."^ Winch would clearly
agree with Rousseau that we cannot speak of men in the
state of nature bein^, "evil" and desiring the "property"
of others. In effect men in the state of nature cannot
bo regarded as fully human though they have the potentiality
to become hun.an. For Winch to be human one must be a
social creature with language who develops needs through
his participation in society and who learns rules through
language and then applies them to new and changing sit-
uations. '
Winch's recognition that we are social beings con-
iJtituted in large part by the social and linguistic
coiijmunities of which we are a part comes through very
clearly in his discussion of the concept of authority,
a discussion unefully contrasted with Dahl's.
kPeter Winch, "Man and Society in llobbes and Rousseau,"in Maurice Cranston and Richard S. Peters, eds
.
,
Hobbos
_and Rousseau
.
(Garden City: Doubleday, 1972), p. 230.
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Winch's central point, as we have seen is that hunan
action is rule governed. There .ust be a right and a wron,,
way of doing thin^rs
,
and this fact inust be understood by
the participants. To participate in rule governed activit
includes the acceptance of authority. There cannot b
right and a wrong way of doing things if the decision as
to what is right and i.rong is merely arbitrary, a matter
of my own caprice. When it comes to following rules I
nmet as a matter of logic accept what certain other people
say as decisive. Authority thus is not a sort of influence,
but an internal, conceptual relationship among persons and
one which is basic to social life,
V/hen we submit to authority we are not bowing to an
alien will. We are directed by the idea of the right way
of doing something in connexion with the activity we are
performing. The authoritative character of an individual's
will derives from its connexion with that idea of a right
5way.
Winch is here arguing against Dahl's contention that
authority is simply one form of power. The difference is
significant because it once again sug^-ests different
conceptions of human nature. Authority to Winch is an
5Peter Winch, "Authority" in Anthony (mint on, ed.,
Political Philosophy
, (London: Oxford University Press,
1967), pp. 97'-101.
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xnternal set of relationships, shared concepts basic to
society aa such. It is not sor.ething added after the fact
to secure certain ongoing activities because we could not
have t.,ese activities in the first place without these
internal ties. Dahl sees society as a set of individuals
in conflict for certain given or instinctive (primary) goals.
Authority is the construction after the fact of rational
justifications for these goals and not basic to the
social interaction out of which such goals emerge.
In considering these points it is important to reali;
that Winch is not denying the possibility of completely
conditioned behavior, for failure to see this has been the
source of much misunderstanding of him. He is denying
that fully conditioned behavior is human action
. The dog
who has learned a trick possesses a learning different
from the man who has learned the number system. In the
former case a given stimulus will always produce the same
response. In the latter case the man is applying a rule
and because ho knov/c the rule he can produce results he
has never seen before and has never seen his teacher
produce. ICnowledge of a rule is more difficult, but it
implies the possibility of creativity, the totally new
response. The creativity opened up by language and
society is basic to the view of man.
On a related plane is the fact that language and
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society make us .oral bein^^s, beings who are not merely
aton,s or self-interest. Our concepts define for us rules
of interaction with our fellows and these constitute
our identity. Hunan beings who act according to rules
can know a right and a wron^- way to do something;. As
soon as wo can be .aid to understand what we do we can be
said to act n^orally. For exar.ple to respect the rights
Of property involves knowledge of its contradictory, what
it would be to do otherwise. The understanding of rules
means that we are capable of beconiing aware of an alter-
native to our conduct, and in so far as we are rule
fjoverned beings we can choose to do otherwise. I^nowledge
and choice are key aspects of the concept of moral behavior,
Thus the growth of language and society inakes us moral
beings and it is only as we becoine social beings in this
sense that we achieve full humanity. Even if we could
give any meaning to such concepts as conditioned virtue,
it would be a denial of our full humanity because it
robs us of our freedoms.
Winch's critique of Hobbesian atomism is further
reinforced by his analysis of the relationship between
reason and passion. lie argues that reason cannot be torn
from the fabric of human life.^ Because it develops in
^2R*. £ll^f ^^inch, Th£ -T^'^ea of a Social Science
, p. 100.
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the total fabric or life, it ,,ets its shape froc and shapes
the passions of man. The principles and precepts of reason
all derive their sense from the context of human activity
in ^.hd,ch they are applied. Though accepting? Winch's
Sroundinc of reason and lof^ic in on.'^oin^T societies, I
will later criticize his attempt to make criteria of
logic totally relative to the society being studied. Here,
and in an analof-ous way in the discussion of moral dis-
course, his reco.-nition of the social nature of man is
pushed too far toward complete relativism.
Thus Uinch clearly shares Rousseau's repudiation of
the atomistic view of man, a view developed in the
utilitarian tradition and prevalent in muted form in much
of contemporary political science. We shall now want
to show that this social view of man also carries with it
a far different approach to the study of man than that
employed by contemporary political science.
Vinch and the Study of Action
Coming out of the tradition of Wittgenstein, Peter
Vinch rejects the causal-predictivist approach to the
study of human behavior advocated by hobbos and Dahl.
He raakes a sharp distinction between the sort of expla-
nation appropriate to natural science and the kind which
is fittin/T in social science. The distinction can be
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n.ade more clear by spelling, out in abstract terms the
philosophy of science built into the work of Dahl we
discussed above,
iv-hen a natural scientist seeks a causal explanation
Of an event ho is trying to identify recurrent re^^ularities
.
What kind Of event always precedes the event in cjuestion?
If he can find events of type A which always precede
events of type B, he will say that A causes B. A is a
necessary and sufficient condition for the occurrence of
B. The natural scientist also insists that events A be
fully distinct and separately identifiable from events
B. Through this approach he tries to arrive at natural
7laws •
Explanation of this type became immensely popular
In physics during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries,
largely in response to the discoveries of Newton and the
subsequent application of Newtonian mechanics to a whole
range of problems. In the twentieth century this kind of
causal explanation has been carried over into social
science. As Thomas Kuhn has pointed out , ^ in the history
7Alasdair Maclntyre, " The >Vntecedents of Action," inAlasdaxr Maclntyre, Against the Sclf-Imn^es of the Are.(New York: Schocken, I97TJT
8See Thomas Kuhn, The Structiire of Scientific Hevolu-tlons, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, I969JI
69
of science one field often con.es through its success to
exercise a strong influence on other areas.
When the physicist is trying to determine the effects
of high speed neutrons on the nucleus of the atom he has
set procedures or rules for determining if two events
are of the same typo. These rules give him the relevant
criteria of sameness. He has fixed ways for establishing
niass and velocity, and he can say that neutrons of a
particular velocity can cause the fission of nuclei of
a ^iven mass. In this manner he can fashion a law or
even a whole series of laws.
The motion of the subatomic particles is in no way
dependent upon the descriptions given by the scientists.
The criteria for determining the sameness of events are
merely the scientific community's. Through this procedure
predictivist laws are to be established. Laws must be
distinguished from rules, a point of great importanco
for the remainder of this analysis. Laws exist indepen-
dently of the events they describe. They are not norm-
ative principles— tliere is no obligation to obey or
disobey them. They either apply or they do not apply.
If phenomena not predicted by a relevant law occur and
eventually lead the scientific community to construct
a new law, we say that the law has been overturned, not
that it has been violated. In natural science we use laws
to predict events, thoufrh whether the possibility of
prediction is an adequate criterion of good laws is a
debated topic ixmong philosophers of science.
In tho social sciences there has been an attempt to
apply the same procedures as the natural scientists use
to fashion a science of society, one which would embody
laws of society. Thus social scientists construct def-
initions of social class, national wealth, political
stability and seek correlations amonc these factors in
the hope of cenerating laws or at least probabilistic
ereneralizations. They v/ant definitions which will allow
them to compare these factors cross-culturally so that
instances of their operation can be compared to give
law like regularities. The work of Dahl discussed above
is an excellent example of this quest, and we have seen
how in his work an atomistic conception of human nature
nicely sustains and is supported by these scientific
assumptions.
Winch's conception of human nature and human action
su^^gest that this whole approach to the study of man is
wrongr. It is wrong in the ways v/hich it seeks to produce
generalizations and in the status assigned to the general
izations.
Let us consider the social scientist who wants to
correlate degrees of wealth with participation in politic
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Perhaps he wishes to establish cross-culturally the gen-
eralization that those with .ore wealth are more likely to
participate in politics. If he is tryin^^ to be a good
behaviorist. he will take certain observable criteria as
his operational definition of wealth and of political
participation.
Winch would argue here that the behaviorist has
systematically misunderstood human action, for what
determines whether the degree of wealth x has equals y's
degree of wealth is not a set of criteria developed by the
scientific observer but the rules built into the ways
in which the given culture understands and bestows wealth.
In some cultures the man with much money in the bank will
not be considered as wealthy as the owner of large tracts
of land. Some cultures may not even make distinctions
based on wealth. The conclusion which U'inch and others
correctly draw from this is that the study of a culture,
unlike the study of atoms, cannot begin with definitions
imposed from the outside. Human action is constituted by
the set of rules we learn as social beings. The study
of a society must therefore begin from the inside. It
must begin with an examination of the ways in which
the language of a given culture structures its world.
I will say more about what this means and how it is done
later in the chapter.
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From the perspective of Winch if we are goin^ to
understand political participation in a culture, ve
.ust
begin by looking at the culture's understanding of politics,
of participation, and of other related concepts, perhaps
even the culture's view of man. Such a conceptual study
n>ay be able to find the ways in which wealth, as understood
in that society, constitutes reasons for and opens up
avenues to political participation. But we accomplish
this task only by getting at the common meanings which
make communication and behavior possible in the culture.
The behavior of particpation is not something which exists
apart from the concept of political participation, with
its rich ties to many other concepts.
If the essence of social study is the pursuit of a
society's basic world view as embodied in its language,
the generalizations at which we arrive are not law-like.
When we establish a tie between v.ealth and participation,
we point to an institutional and linguistic connection.
Perhaps stewardship is closely connected conceptually with
wealth and so political responsibility has come to bo part
of what it means to be a wealthy man. Certain reasons for
political participation will be culturally acceptable and
comprehensible. This does not mean that members of the
culture would give formal definitions of the concepts
in these terms, only that they in fact use the terms in
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these ways. The actual use of lan^ua^c in life is always
far richer than forn^al definitions suggest and this nust
always be so. Kor are actors in the culture usually aware
of all the rich associations which ^^row up around the
concepts of their lan^^ua,;e. I am only suf,,;esti„g that a
Vinchian would ar^rue that the connections could be made
clear and comprehensible to a member of the culture and
that in ideal circur.s t ancos this would be one measure of
the adequacy of his analysis.
When we say that wealth constitutes a reason for the
action of participation in our hypothetical culture, the
reasoh is in some sense a cause of the action, but there
are important differences from normal natural science
causality. There is a conceptual connection between the
cause (wealth) and the effect (participation) and so we
do not have strict llumean causality, where cause and
effect are completely separable entities. Ue are really
oxplainin;? action throufjh reference to reasons which
would be appropriate to and comprehensible by members of
the culture.
The generalizations may bo causal in the extended
sense of the word, but they are not law-like. This is
one of the most important consequences of the view being-
developed here. This approach to a culture will end up
layinf^ out that culture's own rcf^ularit ios—how it fits
its world tofrether. We may find a whole series of lin^;-
uistic-institutional cormectioiis between land and political
particpation. Built into those are a set of rules which
help to constitute the behavior of men in the culture.
Included in the notion of a rule, however, is the possi-
bility of changing or breaking the rule. Especially as a
culture becomes clear about the rules it implicitly
follows, possibilities of change are even more fully
open. A culture's whole understanding of the nature of
wealth or participation may change and with it many
related concepts and institutions must change. And even
if a culture wants to live by its given rules, new mar-
ginal instnaces of the concept will come up and it will
have to decide whether to include these, A culture whose
paradigm instance of wealth has always been grazing land
will have to decide whether to include wheat acreage.
And we cannot in principle predict ahead of time what
their decisions will be because to predict the evolution
of a concept is in effect to clarify it for them. As
Winch points out, this is analogous to predicting a poem;
to predict it we would have to write it. Thus wliatever
generalizations we attain must derive from an interior
understanding of the culture and to attribute law-like
status to them is to misconstrue their real nature.
Even whore the connection between underlying factors
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and olfects seen.s to have no underlying cultural con.ponent.
the connection still exists in and can only be understood
'
in terms of a conceptual-social matrix. Thus it n.ay be
possible to establish connections between genetic deter-
minants and violent behavior. But what will constitute
"violent behavior" varies with the culture and so an
understanding of the culture's own view of man and society
as built into its concepts and practices remains crucial.
Even in those cases where a rnorc traditional sort of
social science analysis seems feasible, we cannot be content,
as would a natural scientist, with establishing mere tem-
poral priorities. Genetic factors may be probabilistically
related to murder, but murder as a concept and social
practice is closely tied to other concepts and practices
x^hich are subject to change. The social scientist who
does not make society aware of this tragically misleads.
Treating human action lil.e the movement of electrons, he
may unduly constrict possibilities for social change.
Nothing that I have said denies that we can and do
establish generalizations about a culture at a given point
in time. We may find tliat certain groups are always
regarded by others in a specific way and that consequently
they are denied important privileges. We also make pro-
dictions on the basis of these generalizations. Thus
generalizations about the relationship of racial prejudice
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to economic affluence may bo correct, but when we view
them as laws we forget that the relationships may change,
especially as changinft- instances of the "inferior" group
occurs. Secondly and more importantly we forget that this
generalization is tied to and gets its meaning from a whole
set of cultural meanings about wealth and personal worth.
By failing to put the regularity in the larger context
of cultural meanings we deprive people of a chance to
become fully aware of its implicit connection to many
facets of our cultural life. The possibility that social
change can be effected through the actions of self-conscious
moral agents is thus blunted. \vTien the possibility of
expanded consciousness is lessened, whatever social change
occurring is more likely to be the result of manipulation
or other forms of behavior control.
To conclude this discussion of an internal conceptual
approach to social science I want to distinguish it briefly
from contemporary social science's concern with "political
culture." Then I will provide an indirect defense of this
approach by showing that it gives us a way around some of
the difficulties presented by the conventional free will
debates. I ajn not claiming tliat these questions are solved
or that a final proof of a social view has been developed,
only that plausible reasons can be found for adopting
this approach.
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Even positivist social scientists have for so.ne tin.c
been aware that the study of human behavior would have to
involve son.e consideration of the concepts of the actors,
but their ideas differ widely fro. Winch's. Recent attempts
to explain the stability of certain V/estern derr.ocracios
have placed great ez^.phasis on the political culture.
Political culture is defined as the co^^nitive, affective,
and evaluative orientations of individual actors toward
the political objects of the system. ^ To many behav-
iorists this seems an ideal way to embody the ideas of
people in their models of society. The social scientist
can objectively ascertain what groups and people know
and what their feelings and attitudes are, and this data
can then be used as evidence to construct causal laws.
These categories suggest that reason and emotion are
fully distinct and separable entities and that action is
fully separable from the ideas the actors have about it.
I have commented on some of the problems in making such
assumptions. A second limitation of this approach lies
in the fact that one is getting at a set of individual
attitudes without layin.- out the set of cultural meanings
and connections which give these attitudes their full
9(Jabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civj c Culture
,(Boston: Little, Drown, and Co., 1963"), Ch. 1,
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sienificance and which are the basis of communication within
the culture by people who disafrree with each other. An
analo/Ty here will help n,ako my point more clear.
Let ur, suppose we were to study the ^ame of chess with
the aim of explaining the behavior of the participants.
We might ask each participant how he played the game and
how his strategy differed from his opponent's. One player
might say that he believed in an aggressive style of play;
another might declare that he tried to confuse his opponent.
On the basis of such research we might draw some conclusions
about victory in chess.
Yet a question of transcendent importance remains:
do we really understand what the game of chess is all about.
We cannot understand victory or aggressive play until we
understand the meaning of a move in chess. And we don't
understand that until we know the rules shared by both
opponents, rules which make the game of chess what it is.
When the players are asked about the game and why they
often win or lose they will discuss their differences
from their opponents, but they are not discussing the
shared rules which make meaningful and possible the game
they both play. These shared rules are implicit in and
make possible the practices of the game and their dis-
cussion of it.
Let us move from this analogy to the question of
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understanding^ human behavior. The argument now becomes
that human action can bo understood only in terms of the
shared meanings which constitute a culture. Consider
the example of voting;. Voting is an action which takes
on its meaning because of a set of basic distinctions
present in a culture. It is not the mere physical act
of pulling a lever. It means something because of such
distinctions as that between free and coerced behavior,
distinctions which are built into our language and
practices and give meaning to such actions as voting.
There is in other words a set of intersubjective meanings
which are present in the practices of a society and give
them meaning. These are in a sense assumptions built
into the total way we conceive the world and because they
are so basic and underlie all the communication of a
culture they do not come through in any set of answers to
questionaires about individual opinions on topics of
current interest.
But finding the central lin^i-uistic distinctions in
order to understand the important practices of a society
is a problematic process. As Taylor points out, its
difficulties are equal and analogous to those of fei'reting
The discussion of this point and the voting example
draws on Charles Taylor's excellent article, "Interpre-
tation and the Sciences of Man," Keview of Metii|jiiysic3
,
25 (1971).
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out the syi^jbolic moaning of a Biblical text. There is
always roon, for legitiruate dispute in the interpretation
of texts, though I would not agree with the implication
which sometimes creeps into Taylor's essay that the proce
is totally relativist and subjective. Some interpretation
clearly stand outside the pale of the plausible.
We must therefore be engaged in the process of
ferreting out the root metaphors of a culture, and to do
this we must understnad the culture from within. Ve can't
begin by imposing our concept from without but must
intuitively insert ourselves into the culture.
From the behavioral perspective there are serious
problems with this approach. In the first place once we
argue that the basic conceptual distinctions a society
makes are inextricably bound up with or constitute the
behavior of the society, we can no longer aim for causal
generalizations about societies. Actions can be understood
only within the context of individual cultures and prac-
tices cannot be predicted. Two "similar" actions or
remarks in different cultures are not necessarily the
same. Thus these events cannot be used to formulate
cross-cultural causal generalizations. Consider Alasdair
Maclntyre's discussion of the problems faced by Almond
and Verba:
• • .Almond and Verba argue that Italians
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are less committed to
. . .the actions oftheir 6Toverninent than are Gernans or Enrlish-
nien, oflerlnf^ as evidence the fact that 'theItalian respondents as compared to the En^^lishand German respondents to their survey, placedsuch actions very low on a list of itonis towhich they had been asked to cive a rank
order in ternn of the an^ount of pride theytook m them. At no point do Almond andVerba pause to ask whether the concept
of pride is the same in the three different
national cultures, that is, to ask whetherthe different respondents had after all been
asked the same question. J3ut in fact the
concept of pride.
. .in Italy is not the
same as that pride in England. The notion
of takinf- pride in Italian culture is stillinexorably linked.
. .to the notion of honor.What one takes pride in is A,rhat touches on
one's honor. If asked to list the subjects
which touched their honor, most Italians
would spontaneously place the chastity of
their immediate female relatives high on
the list— a connection that it would occur
to very few Enffliahmen to raalce. These notions
of pride and honor partially specify and are
partially specified by a notion of the familyitself importantly, if imperfectly, embodied
in the actualities of Italian family life.H
The above quotation clearly illustrates the close
interweaving of language, thought, culture and practices
and the problems thus created for a simple causal approach.
These problems are closely tied to the impossibility of a
predictivist model of social science, as discussed above.
P^rom this anti-behavioral perspective the social
Alasdair Maclntyre, "Is a Science of Comparative
Politics Possible?," ±n Maclntyre, Against the Self-
images of the Age
, pp. 262-263.
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con-
in
scientist Should essentially
.e en.a.ed in the process of
providing a portrait of a culture-what is its basic
ception Of itself as expressed in its institutions and
the assumptions embodied within its language. This task
Is Closely allied with that of the En.-lish ordinary
language philosophers, of who™ the late John Austin is
perhaps the »ost outstanding, example Such a social
science raises the self-awareness of a culture,
.a.es us
aware of .any of our implicit rules and thus brings about
the possibility of change. Thus it can hardly be value
free. And in fact the social scientist's view of hu,„an
nature will have a bearine on his interpretation of a
culture, a point Taylor has properly stressed. Thus in
addition to a retreat fron, causality this perspective
also rejects the possibility of the positivisfs idolized
"neutral observer." Different interpretations of a given
society n,ay in effect involve a paradigm dispute. Evidence
will be relevant, but not in the simple knock-down sense
assumed by an earlier positivism.
In conclusion we have discussed a philosophical
position which rejects the possibility of law-like general-
izations. A major reason for a science of comparative
'^John Austin, "A Plea for Excuses," Philosophical
ff?S?'l970r"*
(London: Oxford'uni vcrsity
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politics has always been the notion that comparison is
the social scientist's replacement for experiment in the
natural sciences. Comparison yields law-like general-
izations. The argument made by the critics is that the
so-called laws established by comparative politics have
resulted from reading into all cultures certain aspects
present only in our own, and ones subject to change even
in our own. Thus the view of man as autonomous bargainer
has been an important source of meaning in our culture,
and social scientists have universalized this notion
by suggesting that interest articulation and interest
aggregation are what politics is all about. But these
very concepts would mean nothing to a society which had
no concept of bargaining. The laws based on the use of
such concepts can only be literal nonsense.
On the basis of these arguments 1 do not want to
suggest that there is no basis for comparative politics.
I merely want to redefine the nature of the field. The
real task of the discipline is to help us become aware
of the meaning of our own culture by broadening our
awareness of other cultures. Nor does it follow from the
above arguments that we must accept all cultural patterns
as being equally fulfilling. Man is a social being and
his behavior must be understood from the inside first,
by reference to the basic meanings built into his culture.
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But once we understand our own and other cultures we are
in a better position to elaborate an ideal of man and to
consider the ways in which various culturc'il patterns
frustrate or enhance the emergence of various facets of
that ideal.
My reraainine task in this chapter is to discuss
briefly one important philosophical implication of this
view of man. The effort to view human behavior in causal,
law-like terms has become connected with a philosophical
debate which goes back at least as far as Auir^ustine. If
human behavior is caused, in what sense if any can we
speak of men as free agents, deliberating beings who make
choices in terms of their goals and purposes? Advocates
of causal laws have responded to this critical question
with two major arguments. To say that human behavior
is caused is only to assert that certain factors invar-
iably precede the occurrence of particular actions.
Causality in this sense is not the same thing as compulsion,
The preceding factors do not compel action. Advocates of
a causal approach also argue that an unwillingness to
tudy man in this way leaves us with a view of human
ction as totcilly random or disorderly. V/e cannot give
any sense to the regularities and coherences which we
recognize as a part of human life—and which w© need if
we are to bo held responsible for the consequences of our
s
a
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own actions.
These arguments have led in turn to long discussions
about the relationship of causality and con^pulsion and
about the concept of moral responsibility. It has been
observed that these traditional arguments about causality
and the freedon, of the will appeared to be getting no
where. When this is the case it is often because the
debate has not been stated in proper terms and needs to
be restructured. It seems to be that such advocates of
ordinary language as Winch and Austin have in effect
done just that. Their vehicle for this achievement has
been the exaiijination of the concept of human action which
wo have been discussing in this chapter.
The view of human action developed here leads us
to regard major, large social change as inherently
unpredictable. The social scientist may show how certain
root metaphors and conceptual distinctions have fitted
Into the institutional development of the culture. These
concepts do not exist in a vacuum and thus do not change
in entirely random ways. The social scientist may foresee
problems for a society in its self-interpretation, Taylor,
for instance, sugi-:ests that the kind of meanings implicitly
present in our Protestant, work-ethic culture may have
gone sour for us. This kind of culture may once have
implicitly meant community to us, but it can no longer
as
)ur
;ure
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carry that meaning because its actual development h
altered us and our relationship to each other and o,
world, A productive, work-oriented barpaininc culti
may have once supplied the humanly necessary pattern of
njeaninrr embodied in the notion of community, but once built
such a culture comes to lose this meanin^^. There is nothing
now to accomplish, no task of building a new society which
unites men in rebellion against the old. The social
scientist can perhaps foresee these problems, or more
accurately he can see the meaning of practices changing;
but he cannot predict the emergence of new concepts and
practices which will replace man as bargainer with new
needed meanings and give us a new sense of identity and
community. If we had these new concepts and practices,
in a sense we would already be in the future.
But this does not mean that human behavior is
random. Behavior is related to language, and language
is a social product. The behavior of any individual will
show orderliness and coherence over time because we are all
implicated in conceptual systems which none of us as single,
isolated beings creates, and which cannot change immed-
iately. But this view also suggests that we are free in
the sense that we contribute to the development of this
common language, l/e can develop the sort of cultural
self-awareness which alia 3 us to participate in the process
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of chnnginf: the cultural „eb i„ which all „,e„ implicated
and v/hich men create.
The social critic can be enf^a^^^d in a dialogue with
his culture v.hich creates new meanings and so new patterns
of action. I xvould ar;.iue that today within certain parts
of our culture the meaning of the concept work is being
subtly chanfjed as the concept becomes tied to ideals of
human fulfillment no longer related to the denial of
self-aspirations for the sake of later egoistic rewards.
The concept is freeing itself from certain acquisitive
features. With this will inevitably go many other cul-
tural changes. Our freedom lies in effect in our ability
to be social critics, to become aware of our culture and
to participate in the ongoing cultural dialogue. But
this freedom is not adequately characterized by the imago
of the individual, isolated atom striking out randomly,
"at will." One reason the old free will debate has
generated such problems is its close connection to this
atomistic view of freedom, a view which seems to ec.uato
freedom with whim. But real human freedom lies in the
ability to make changes in meanings and practices which
are comprehensible to a culture or subculture. Free acts
are part of cultural change and development.
This viexv oJ' the nature of freedom is highly con-
gruent with the social view of man we have been elabor-
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atin^ in this chapter. It is furthermore, congruent with
an exuniinatiun of the Avay in A.hich we use Ireodom in
ordinary discourse. For we do not say tliat an individual
is free sinipli ci t er
,
but that he is free of an obstacle
to achieve certain ends."''^ Freedom is always related
to some context of sociall comprehensible ends.
•"^Gerald C. MacCalluin, Jr., "Nef^ative and Positive
Freedom," in Anthony Do Crespi/7ny and Alan Wertheimer,
>
Contemporary i^olitical Theo r;^.
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C PI A P T E R V
HUMAN NATURE AND MORAL CONCEPTS
We have already seen that different views of human
nature are comiected v/ith different approaches to the
moral evaluation of societies. Atomistic views of human
nature are connected with causal, "scientific" approaches
to the study of man. These approaches seem to encourage,
though perhaps not entail, a certain attitude toward the
moral evaluation of societies and moral discourse as a
whole.
The contemporary political scientist believes he
should strive to discover the laws governing the evolution
of society. In this process he is concerned with the
actual patterns of social evolution, not with prescribing
what ought to be. He believes that in so far as his
comiaitnients to a particular moral point of view influence
his concepts and research, his ability to derive social
Isms will bo lessened. If he cones to believe that a
given form of social organization is morally desirable,
he may become tainted with a strong psychological tendency
to believe that it will inevitably come to pass. This
belief may affect his capacity to derive causal laws in
an objective manner. Mainstream political scientists
>ir
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ortoii accuse Marxism of this failing. They argue that
one reason why Marxists believe the course of history
will inevitably produce a classless society, despit.
great historical "evidonce" to the contrary, is the:
strong moral commitment to this outcome, a commitment
which blurs their capacity to read the evidence.
The conception of moral discourse held by mainstream
political scientists is closely related to their view of
how science must proceed. W© have already alluded briefly
to this connection in the case of Dahl. He along with
most mainstream political scientists accepts noncogni-
tivism in ethics, the view that moral positions cannot be
rationally defended and are mere expressions of preference.
The genesis of this position is interesting because
it reflects Hobbesian assumptions about reason and about
language. The logical positivists of the thirties, who
first put this position in modern philosophical garb,
declared that to bo meaningful a proposition must admit
of one or a few procedures which could verify it. This
veriflability criterion grew out of their basic assumption
that language reflects tlie world out there, ^ Since moral
^Discussion and critiques of this view may be found in
J. 0, Urrason, Philosophic a1 Analysis
,
(London: Oxford
Univeriiity Press, 1956) and in Hannah Pitkin, V/ittfrens tein
and Justice
,
(Berkeley: University of California Press,
19727".
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propositions do not seem to adn,it of a simple set of
observations which vould verify then,, positivists asserted
they were meaningless. Later the position was modified
to 3U/-gest that they were mere expressions of preference
or efforts to get one to abide by one's preference: I
like X, do so as v/ell. The view of human discourse as
a tool of our private interests slips in here.
From this point of view one moral judf^ment is rationally
speaking just as acceptable as anooher. Opposed groups in
society are always defending their position in terms of
the public interest or other morally-laden claims. But
the fact that radically different policies arc defended
in moral terms proves that these terms are mere expressions
of personal preference. And because moral propositions are
merely emotive the social scientist has no business de-
fending a moral view toward any society he studies or
letting moral judgments affect his work. Nor will his
analysis of society necessarily entail any moral con-
clusion. "Facts" and "values" are separate. Research
is to be "value neutral."
Critique of Moral Stance of Mainstream Political Science
Despite its pretensions of value neutrality, con-
2
Tlie developr.ient of noncognit d viom in ethics is ana-
lyzed in W, D. Hudson, Modern Moral Philosophy
,
(Garden
City: Anchor Books, 1970).
92
teuiporary poJitical science do«s carry obvious ethical
implications. There is already a lar^e literature on
various aspects of the connection between is and ou^^ht in
modern political science and so I shall n,ake only a few
general rentarks.
It ±B not surprisinfT that there is v. strong tendency
in pluralist literature to define the good society in term
which bear a striking resorablance to contoniporary American
society,
..ike Hobbcs, Robert Dahl cannot fully eschew
the use of moral terms, and when he uses words of noral
prair.e these are often reserved for American democracy.
A political system in which a wide range of desires is
expressed is favored because all desires ar>e regarded
as ethically equal and the social construction of desires
is not understood. People simply have wants and in a
formally open society lacking extreme inequalities these
wants will surface. Thus a system with many interest'
groupa and open access to decision makers is regarded as
the good society. The same view of man which sustains
a particular conception of value neutral science also
paradoxically sanctions pluralism as the good society.
Secondly, a pluralist society is likely to be espe-
cially congenial to modern political scientists because
it is a society to which their whole methodology seems
especially applicable. There are clear inputs into the
s
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oysiem in the form of interest group demands and outputs
in the form of policies. This allows one to explain out-
puts through a vector sum analysis of the inputs. This
system squares perfectly with the nature of science. It
is as though modern social science wore a clear copy of
the Nov/tonip,n universe.
Lastly, pluralists show a tendency to assume that
American society represents some sort of highest resting
point in world history. They see it as the culmination
of forces present in various stages around the world.
Thir. tendency is most apparent in the development liter-
ature. Devolopmont theorists look for prerequisites of
pluralist democracy and they find these in industrial-
ization, urbanization, literacy. These underlying factors
are considered to be the iujportcmt causal agents in
political development.
Development theorists are doing two things of dubious
validity here. They are absolutizing the pattern of
development of the United States and l.'estern Europe.
Historically in the West the growth of cities and industry
was associated with democracy, and the assumption is that
everywhere else this pattern will hold. No thought is
given to tho possibility that in societies with a differ-
ent understanding ol" the value of material comforts the
sclienjo of development as well as tho content of the
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deniocratic ideal might be very different
. Secondly, a
major r«ason why the experience of the West exerts such
influence is the causal fraraework within which development
theoris ts work. it h.,s been r.aid that development liter-
ature reflects the ethnocentric bias of much work in
comparative politics. But one reasoii why this field has
been so ethnocentric is that its philosophical undei--
pinninfjs assume the regularity and inevitability of patterns
with which the investi^yator has become familiar. a number
of societies went through similar patterns of development
and one therefor© a.sserts he has found a causal pattern.
In the future the same events will produce the same
effects.
Before v/o can fully understand the inadequacies of
the moral perspective of contemporary political science,
it is necessary to turn to problems in its noncognitivist
theory of moral discourse. Many modern philosophers have
become dissatisfied with the pooitivist view that moral
tei^ms arc mere ©xprest^ions of preference. The real
grammar of moral terms, as revealed by a close study of
ordinary diacourse, suggests that these terms are much
moi'e complex tlian attempts to view them in emotive terras
imply,
Charles Tayloi* and Kurt Daier have led the attack
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on the po3itivic;t theory or moral discourse.^ I will arguo
first that their work provides a sound description of
moral discourse in our culture. Then I will show that their
view of moral terras is not ethnocentric but rather is an
outgroi/th of certain features necessary to moral dis-
course as such. In the process of developing- these claims
I will correct some of the extreme relativism implicit in
the conclusions drawn by Winch from his social view of
human nature. If there are formal criteria for moral
discourse there are then standards by which we may judge
some practices within a society to bo inconsistent with
its own basic moral posture. Lastly, I will ar/^-ue that
we can provide some reasons for supporting a concept of
person which allows us not only to criticize particular
practices within a society but also the opportunities for
personal development within a society. These allow us
not only to question the consistency of social practices
but also to wei(;h societies as a ivhole. \!q can {jivc some
content to the formal requirements of moral discourse.
Winch has failed to grasp Rousseau »s insight that a social
view of man need not imply acceptance of all practices
"^Kurt Baier, The Moral Point o_f View, (New York:
Random House, 19^5) aiJd Charles Taylor, "Neutrality in
Political Science," in Peter Laslett and W. G, Runciman,
eds
.
,
Philosopl ty;, Po 1 i t j . c s , and Society , ^x'd series,
(Oxford: Uasil iJlackwcll, lyb?).
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within a society nor of all societies.
In attacking the positivists Taylor and Baier deny
that the political scientist can plausibly claim to be
merely drnwinc out causal laws which explain and describe
reality. Our interpretation and analysis of reality in-
evitably carries with it ethical implicacations
, and the
connection is not merely psycholof;ical but lo^rical. In
maintaining that a given theory in the social sciences
necessarily carries with it ethical implications, Taylor
also implies that there are rational criteria relevant
to ethical judgiaenta. lie and Baior defend such a con-
tention through a close look at the way in which we use
ethical terns in ordinary language, a proper cipproach for
those who see language and reality as inextricably
connected.
The centi^al contention here is that the logical
grauitnar of statoments about likes and wants is different
fi'oiii that of statements of good. We see this point when
we look at the different ways in which we talk when wo
use these concepts. If I say that I like x, questions
about why are only appi'opriate in the sense that I may
specify what it is about x that I like, as for instance
its taste. V.'e might then go on to say we liked its
sweet taste, but we would find it odd if someone kept
pressing us at this point as to why we liked the sweet
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taste. But if I ..ay that a policy or event is ,,ood, I am
liornially expected to bo able to ^ive reasons, and the
reasons must be of a certain kind. Statements about good
must, .thr.t la, meet certain roquirei-ient a
. They are not
arbitrary expressions of preference. If j say that
Docialized medicine is c:ood and when asked why can only
repeat that it is good I will not be understood as engaging
in proper use of the term. Taylor summarizes this point
as follo\/s :
A judgment that I like something doesn't
need grounds. That is, the absence of
grounds doej.n't undermine the claim "I
like X"
, . .But unless we adduce reasons
for it (and moreover reasons of a certain
kind as we shall see below) v/o cannot show
that our claim that x is good says more
than "I like x,"^
The reasons ur.cd to delend something as good must
take a certain form. If I say that the murder of x is
good because x is a Vietcong sympathizer, I must be willing
to ray that J .-should bo killed if I shared the same
characteristics which made the sympathizer evil. Other-
wise I would not be understood as making a moral argument.
In addition the principle must be one which can be
applied to everyone; it must, that is, bo universalizable
.
Lastly, the reasons used to defend a moral judgment must
92j. cit . , Taylor, p. 30,
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be ones which pertain to the purposes, needo, and interests
of human bein,?s. Or as Baier put this, sowethinf: we defend
as moral must be for the good of all alike. If vo are not
willin- to defend u position in these terms our hearers
will suspect that ue are merely expressing- our personal
likes and dislikes. Te^ylor makes this kind of ar^juinent
in the case of an individual who declares that socialized
raedicine is bad:
But supposin^r he v/as willing to give grounds
for his position
. .
., saying? . . ."Too many
people would be dressed in v/hite"? V.e would
reraain in doubt as to how to take his oppo-
sition, i' or we would be led to ask of his
opposition to the increase of doctors, say,
whether he was inalcing a jud^;inent concerning
good and bad or sianply oxpressinj^ a dislike.
And we v^ould decide this question by looking
at the grounds he adduced for this position.
And if he clairaed to have nothing to say,
his po.-ition would be unintelligible in
exactly the same way as if bo had decided
to remain silent at the outset and leave
his original statement unsupported.
5
An analysis of ordinary discourse does then seem to
provide sound grounds for Boxno connection between our
factual view of the world and our evaluation of it. For
Taylor horo is not constructing his own definition of
good. He is reminding us of the rules we tacitly follow
when we use the concept. This is what he is doing when
he points out the distinctions we always make in questions
-^Ibid.
, p. 53.
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we ask when a man says ho likes x versus the questions
which are approprinte when one says x is c'ooci. Taylor
appeals to ordinary discourse in an effort to show that
we do have fornal rational criteria for the use of moral
judgnionts and that wo are thus not merely expressin/T
preferences
,
On the basis of the arguraents which have been made
thus far it iniftht soem that the social scientist is in a
position to apply moral criteria to ongoing societies.
Yet throughout this work I have been defending the plaus-
ibiJity of a social viou of iflan, a major contention of
which is that societies must be understood in teri:js of
their own language systems, in other words internally.
The argument above seems to try to move us in the dii^ec-
tion of applying moral standards cross-culturally. V,'e
seem now to be saying that outsiders can judge tho moral
adequacy of a society's practices, perhaps even according
to standards not accepted by tlic participants themselves.
At this point I will explore some differences among
those v/ho take a social view of man, Peter Winch has in
fact argued that moral criteria are relative to a society
and that outsiders may not pass judgment, Taylor, JJaier,
and Nielsen would reply that they are not constructing
ethnocentric moral criteria and tliat they are only showing
the criteria of moral discourse which must prevail for
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boins-s to bo social and n,oral. If we can accept their
arguments we will be able to .ay that such criteria as
meeting: human interests needs and purposes are applicable
to all societies. TUe task will then be to ^;ive some
content to that phrase "human interests, needs and pur-
poses," and I will attempt to explain and provide some
defense for the content ^iven it by Rousseau. I will want
to make it more than a formal notion, so^^iothing by which
wo can move beyond questions of cultural inconsistencies.
It is necessary first to distinguish V/inch's con-
ception of cultural relativism from the noncognitivist
position held by the logical positivists. In an article
on human nature v;inch attacks the position of those
ethical philosophers who try to tie moral terminology
to certain sorts of hunsan needs, ^ Though he is attacking
Alasdair Maclntyre, his arguments would apply equally to
Charles Taylor or Kurt Baier. ¥inch arguos that because
human nature is constituted by society the nature of
morality will depend upon the conception of human nature
built into the culture. Winch remarks: "VAiat we can
ascribe to human nature does not determine what we can
and what we cannot make sense of; rather what we can and
^Peter »/inch, "Human Nature," in Royal Institute of
Philosophy, Tiie ]^ropcr Study
« (Now York; NacxMillan, I97I).
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what v;e caiinot inake sense of doterminos what we can
ascribe to hur.an nature. It is precisely for this reason
that the concept of hian.an nature is not the concept of
something: fixed and G:iven;
. .
."'^
In other words moral codes and the needs on which
thoy are based must bo explained in terms of the ^iven
culture. Even the connection of morality to human needs
depends on the culture, and presumably one could find
cultures in which there is a moral discourse not tied in
any way to human needs. Moral evaluation may be char-
acterized as merely a sot of standards which are involved
in various institutionalized practices.
Winch thus denies that we can establish cross-cul-
tural moral grammar. I\irthermore he denies that we can
question if a particular practice in a society is in-
consistent or irrational. We who are outsiders must begin
with the assumption that there is a logic, an internal
lofiic, to their practices. Criteria of logic are not
God-given; thoy are themselves part of a culture. Winch
has pushed a social view of man as far as it can be pushed,
7 Ibid
.
, p. 10.
0Peter Wxnch, The Idea of Social Science ana its
Relfiti on to Pl ii losopliy
,
(London: Routledgo and Kegan
Paul, 19587, p. 100,
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The beginning of an answer to his position must show that
there is a coiumon logic to moral discourse and tliat the
existence of such a logic is in fact one necessary aspect
of man's social nature. These forr-al requirements of
moral discourse do allow us to raise legitimately questions
of consistency within a culture. Once this is established
we can move on to discuss the possibility of giving
specific content to these formal standards and so of
judging whole societies.
The issues hero become clearer when we recognize that
Winch is not taking a noncognitivist theory of ethics.
Ho would probably admit that the work of Taylor and Uaier
is a good analysis of ethical discourse in Anglo-American
culture, I suspect, though, he would side with Paul
Taylor in the assertion that Daier and Charles Taylor
have inappropriately universalized certain aspects of
modern Vi'esterr. liberal morality: Thoy have been guilty
of an ethnocentric fallacy in attributing to all moral
discourse features found only in the moral discourse of
9the modern \v'est. The argument is that certain egali-
tarian feiitures supposedly common to moral discourse
everywhere are violated by some institutions and those
^Paul Taylor, "The Ethnocentric Fallacy," in The
Monist , Vol. 47, (1963), pp. 5^33-534.
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"violations" have been defended in a langiia^;c which can
only bo conciderod moral. Paul Taylor also, along lines
similar to the Winch attack, su^jeests that the Jiaier
denial of self-interest as the basis of any possible
morality is clearly ethnocentric and that one could easily
conceive of egoistic ethical systems.
Kai Nielsen has advanced arguments on two levels
against this position. ''^ He first remarks that a number
of seemingly "immoral" institutions are in fact embraced
within the terms of moral discourse as set forth by Baier
and Taylor. The storm trooper who advocates the death
of Jews is still making a moral argument (for ho says he
would accept death if he had the qualities he attributes
to Jews.) His argument becomes understandable as a moral
position only if he is willing to reverse his position
and apply it to himself. The storm trooper and the modern
liberal differ not over the meaning of moral terms but
over their own factual understanding of various groups
in the population. Study of some of the most notorious
causes in human history will sustain the kind of argument
Nielsen is making here. Aristotle's defense of slavery
is a moral defense precisely because it attributes certain
^^Kai Nielsen, "On Moral Truth," in American Philosophi '
S.'3l Qu-trtevly, 32 (1968), pp. 9-25.
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rational deficiencies to the barbarians who are to be
enslaved and justifies the practice in terms of all con-
cerned. An analysis of the Southern defense of slavery
before the Civil ¥ar reveals the sanie chttiactoristics
.
Thus an examination of moral argaiments in different
cultures and periods points to a comraon grammatical
structure present in such arguments.
On a deeper level Nielsen and Taylor argue in effect
that moral discourse must have certain basic critei-ia
given the nature of ninn as a social and rational beinf:.
Croos-cultuial similarities in grammatical structure are
not morcly accidental. The argument is analogous and
related to the contention that language and society
presuppose certain general criteria of rationality. The
requireroent that moral discourse be a discourse of
principle and not merely self-interest and that moral
reasoning advance considerations pertaining to human needs
is not merely relative to a particular culture because
moi'ality is constructed by i^ational beings who live
in society, and the very existence of society demands
a point of view above self-interest, a moral point of
viev/. As Nielsen puts it:
Any society needs sotDo device for impartially
adjudicating conflicts of interest. Society
is necessary for humfjin beings, and when
huinrm beings J.ive together, band together in
a society with at least the minimal coop-
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eration thi o implies, they will have conflictsof interest
.
If, when such conflicts occureach raon wero to oeek to further his seJf-
'
xnterei,t i lo>ie, there would be the kind ofconllict and chaos in society that no
reasonable uan could desire. In fact if menwere to act in this way, it would not evenbe correct to spea]c of them as livin^r toretherin society. Thus to live to/-:ether, to fur-ther one of the main ends of morality men
must adopt rulos which override self-interestTo take the moral point of view of necessityinvolves conforrain;- to such rulos. but to
conform to such rulos is not simply to commit
oneself to liberal i.estern morality. It is
rather to adopt a point of view that is and
must be implicit in all n.oral reasoning. ^ ^
Thus these characteristics are not infinitely variable.
They are basic to man as a rational, social beinfr, a
point with which Rousseau would fully concur.
Once wo i.;ee that our very understanding of man as
a rational, social bein^>: forces us into this view of the
nature of moral discourse, certain conclusions follov/
with respect to the evaluation of existing societies.
It becomes possible for us to point to specific practices
in any society as wron^- or irrational in terms of the
general moral norms built into society as such. In most
societies wo can fii;d examples of groups who are treated
in ways which tacitly controvert the formal principles
of the society. We nov/ cannot assume that such treatment
1 1 Op . clt
. ,
Nielsen, p. 21,
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is moral in ternm of that t.ociety's view of morality.
Logical consistency is built into morality, but in most
societies we will find groups who are denied privileges and
yet held to responsibilitioa which attest iirplicitly to
their full personhood. When no morally appropriate reason
is being given for this incon£5istency we arc proper in
pointing out the moral contradiction involved in the
practice.
The first part of the argument against Winch's pure
social relativinm thus must be that a social view of man
roust not end in a denial of the very possibility that
certain aspects of a society might be inconsistent v/ith
one another. V/o must not attempt as empathctic students
to find criteria of logic or rationality after the fact
to justify or explain every social practice. All societies
are not internally coherent, rational, and moral in all
respects; and certain generally applicable criteria can
be used to bring out the inconsistencies and irration-
alities in ways which could in principle be understood by
members of the culture. Thus in Victorian England and
even to a considerable extent in the contemporary United
States one can find instances of citizens who strongly
protest the presence of pornography and call publicly
for lav/s to limit its dissemination. Yet those same
persons can be found enjoying pornography within the
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the confines of their own homes and passing it to friends.
A social science committed in advance to find the con-
sistency in such practices might well ir.i sunders tand
either the individual hypocrisy or the aore subtle psych- •
ological and social problems symptoiaized by the incon-
sistency in these patterns of action.
In addition we cannot always assume that the stated
reasons for an action are an agent's real reasons. Some
merabers of a society may feel hostility toward others they
are ashamed or afraid to admit their real reasons for.
Thus hostility toward young college students or poor
blacks may bo defended on the grounds of the "subversive"
impact of these groups whereas far different factors
underlie the hostility. Wo cannot ever get at such
reasons if wo assume from the beginning that stated reasons
for action are always the real reasons,
In raising these questions of consistency we are not
applying external criteria of morality and rationality,
but the criteria of morality and rationality as such.
Views and practices which do not correspond with a society's
conception of reality or which are internally inconsistent
are irrational. These criteria of rationality are, as
12For a discusBion of this and related points see
Alasdair Maclntyre, "Rationality and the Explanotion of
Action" and "The Idea of a Social Science" in Maclntyre,
Against the Self-images of the Af^e
,
(New York: Schocken
Books, 1971),
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Steven Lukes correctly points out, required for the exis-
tence of lancoiar^e an suchj^ Th±{^ line ol thinkinf,' is not
inconsistent with the requirement that the study of a
society besin with the society's ovm understanding of
itself as expressed in and throu,-h its language. Rather
it c,ro\fS:i out of a more complete understanding of wliat it
is to be a creature of language and society, for to begin
with the gratuitous acsunption that everything in a society
is defensible and cottiprehensible in that society's terras
is paradoxically going to lead to misunderstanding of that
society.
At this point in our agruraent it is, however, nec-
essary to point out what we have not established. The
requirement about for the good of all alike (Baier) or
human interests, needs, £^nd purposes (Taylor) does not
take us too far. When human societies are inconsistent
in their treatment of particular groups, do not treat
ther.i in terms ol' their conccpticn of hunjioii needs, we can
call these specific practices into question. But thus
far x^c have given these phrases no specific content , All
I have done is suggest a common cross cultural grammar
for moral terms. Is thei'e any way by which we can choose
between different social conceptions of human needs and
1 3Steven l.,u.kcs, "Somo Problems about Kiitionality, " in
Bryan U'ilson, ed .
,
Rationality
,
(Wew York: Harp3r and Row,
1970).
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purposes? Porhap<; hero wo will onco again be driven back
into a more reduced form of cultural relativity with the
claim that the raeaninc of good of all alike depends on the
concept of por-on developed In the different societies,
and that such a concept can legitimately vary indefinitely
from society to society. Can we give content to this
grammatical structure and thus put ourselves in a place
to weigh whole societies against each other or ag£iinst
some ideal?
These questions bring us to the heart of Kousseau's
^flSiiii Contrac t ^ Rousseau recognized that in entering
society men become fundamentally different beings. They
give up their original independence and are transformed
into moral beings with a laiowledge of good and evil. Yet
to Rousseau this was a niixod blessing and the state of
nature with its independence provided a standard by which
to weigh the justifiability of this sacrifice. Only in
communities where there is a pax'ticular sort of relation-
ship of individuals to the moral and social code is the
sacrifice of this primeval independence justifiable. In
the remainder of this chapter I will discuss the nature
of the com'munity advocated by Rousseau and some of the
arguments which can be advanced in its behalf, Tliis
analysis v;ill shov./ that the concept of person may not
properly bo given any content we wish and that moral
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notions thus have substantive as well as Tormal require-
ments. An ar{;un,ent of this sort is based upon a recog-
nition and defense of the participant capacity of all
human bein(-s and is finally an outfjrowth of the claim
that hunian beings are ends and not mere objects. These
considerations provide some grounding for the development
of a cross-cultural moral point of view, a point of view
implying both grammar and more specific content. Finally
I will consider the kinds of moral perspective on and
proposals for chan^'/e of contemporary society to which a
Rousscauian view of man leads. The critiques from this
perspective are far deeper than the ones managed by those
political scientists who do advance some critiques of
pluralism from within the perspective of abstract in-
dividualism.
Before going into Rousseau's ideas about a satis-
factory notion of moral and communal development, I will
briefly sketch a diametrically opposed and historically
very influential view, one which provides a contrast
model which will sharpen our understanding of Rousseau,
Burke and Durkheim both hold a moral developmental
view of man which rejects the Hobbesian assumption that
man can only be a creature of self-interest. Both believe
that man without a stable set of moral restraints is aim-
less and self-destructive . Man must experience a stable
Ill
moral law over against his inclinations, because these,
left to themselves, are oo strong and so numerous that
they can never be fulfilledJ Man can have a satisfying
life only when he experiences over against himself a nioral
code which places clear licjitationa on his desires. This
moral code must become a part of one's whole personality
or self
-identity
.
One can then know the limitations of
the human situation and find acceptcmce of these limits
itself a rewarding oxperiancc as v;ell as finding his mod-
erate pleasure all the more rewarding because they are
soon as right and the impulses tov/ard them not unlimited.
If morality is to serve this role in human life it
must be part of a tradition handed down to men. Hierarch-
ical societies where roles are clearly structured and not
subject to the whims of individuals are ideal in this
respect. The moral code grows out of and sustains the
structure of society and the great mass of mon merely learn
what is expected of them. Morality cannot achieve its
purpose unless 5.,t is experienced an something over against
man, and it will not be so experieaiced unless it is handed
down to men as part of the position they inherit in society.
The relationship of men to the moral law is passive.
For a discussion of Durkheim's view of man see Steven
Lukes, "Alientition and Anomie," in Laslett and Runciman,
op, cit.
112
Now it would be very misleading to imply that Rousseau
foui:d everything' in such a picture or morul community laugh-
able. It had ^reat appeal to him, and indeed his attitude
toward authority remained ambivalent throughout l;is life. *
Yot the central thrust of his political thinking demanded
a much more active orientation toward the moral dimensions
of social life on the part of the average citizen.
1 ^In the Social Contract i<ousseau recognizes that tlie
condition of a man's becoming a social being is the sur-
render of the independence of the state of nature. This
sacrifice is justifiable when it makes possible a higher
kind of freedom, the freedom to partipate in the creation
of the laws by which one's will is limited. Because wo
are basically social-morcil bc:ings, our highest freedom
and fullest development consists in the full recoguition
of this lact cuid then in active participation within our
communities in the creation of the laws by which we will
be governed. One gives up his individual independence,
and this sacrifice is justified only by receiving the
right to participate in the making of the general will.
Now it is notorious that the concept of the general
will has been variously interpreted, but much of the best
15Jean-Jciccpies llousseau, "The Social Contract," in
LcL^tcr G, Ci'ocker, od,, Tixo S o
c
x a 1 Contract arid 1)1 r> cours e
on tho Origin of Inecjuali ty , (New York: Washington Square
Press, I9677T
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contemporary scholarship has converged on an interpretation
quite at odds from those who have tried to write ofr Rousseau
as a precursor of tot ali t arianism . ^ The general will is
the will of the wnole con.nmnity for justice and the public
interest. The concepts of community, justice, and the
public interest aro the key concepts for understanding
Rousseau's ideal of the general will.
The concern for justice and the public interest, as
well as Rousseau's understanding of those terras and their
importance in individual development becomes clear when
we consider, following Plamenatz , ^ some of the conditions
necessary for the emergence of the general will. Individuals
are to speak and vote as individuals rather than as members
of a group. There will be no special interest groups in
the ideal community. In this way individuals are encouraged
to think in terms of the needs felt by all citizens as
citizens rather than in terms of specia.1 interests with
which they might bo connected. General equality must also
px^evail. To Rousseau this means that individuals must have
economic independence. He is so concerned about these
conditions because to him the will of all can bo the
See for instance George Kateb, "Aspects of iiousseau's
Political Thought," in Isaac Kiramnick, ed.. Essays in tho
History o^f Politica l Thovight
,
(Englewoud Clilfs: Prentice-
Hall, 1909),
^''john Plamenatz, han and Society , (Mow York: McGraw-
Hill Book Co.), Ch. 10,
Ilk
GonorPl vill or,ly vhon it ir. concerned with the well boinfj
of every person as a person rather than as a plumber,
businessman, etc. Great economic inequality prevents the
development of svch general concern; in other words it
prevents full moral and coriiinunal development. In the
ideal conmiunity men will achieve full moral freedom: they
will freely identify with and work to promote the needs of
persons as persons. Within a truly participr.nt community
of this sort the voice of the majority is likely to
express correctly the general will; but it is important
to seo that iiousseau la not affirming? the universal
wisdom of majority rule and full participation for all
social contexts. This point will be important when wo
consider a Rousseauian perspective on contemporary Amer-
ican society.
Rousseau recognizes that man's identity is in large
measure created by tho sort of society in which he lives.
He is cilso clearly aware that most men in existing societies
T/ill feci no need to participate in tho decisions affecting
them. Perhaps the most baoic point to understand about
Rousseau is that ho is not a need thcoi'ist because lie
understands so deeply the social construction of needs.
The need theorist believes that an ideal of community uiay
be grounded on those needs displayed by individuals in
society. He f^xilo to seo tJiat those ax^e in part the
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product or history: the slave .ay olten show no "behav-
ioral
.aerostation- or a need for rreedo.jS
^^^^^^^^
provides an inadequate foundation to ground an ideal of
co.n.unity upon--it is a very loose and shifting foundation.
Housseau founds his vision of the couu.unity on an ideal of
the autonomous person. lie reco^nizco that his political
theory is Utopian in the sense that it is not based upon
the experience of actual conm.unitles nor upon actual
relt need., but he would ar^ue that any political theory
which lacks a Utopian dimension must be in lar^e measure
an apoloii-y for the established order. Rousseau wants to
broaden self-av.aroness and open up wholly new possibilities
of development.
It is his b.'isic assumption that the complete devel-
opment of what it n<eans to bo a moral and social person
implies a commitment to a participant view of human nature
and thus the participant community. I do not believe that
knock-down arcuments can be advanced to sustain this view,
but there are considerations which can be advanced in its
behalf.
The strongest rrgument for his position lies in the
contention that to be a fully developed person includes
1
8
For a discussion of this subject see V/illiam Connolly,
"Comment on Bay," Inquiry
.
Vol. l^j
, (1971), pp. 237-243,
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not only the ability to obey moral rules but also the
capacity to become reflective about the rules themselves.
Any social view of man recognizes that man is a rule
following being; and to be rule following is different
from being moved by laws of nature. Part of the notion
of follovvring a rule is the possibility of violating or
changing the rule. But for this possibility to be fully
present, people must become aware of the rules they follow.
The existence of rules requires, as Winch correctly
points out, the presence of authority in the community.
A rule implies a right and a wrong way of doing something
and thus established authority which provides a means
of determining what constitutes the right and the wrong
way. The existence of miles depends upon the existence
of community, as our discussion of a private lang-uage
made clear. But none of this implies that authority
must be something over the community. Authority can re-
side in the community as a whole, and when men participate
in the creation Of the most important rules, which deter-
mine the whole tenor of their lives, they can become more
reflectively aware of the rules. Through the creation
of rules men must become aware of their existence. Par-
ticipation is a way by which one develops the capacity
for reflection about the moral law and thus the ability
to modify it critically. Some important rules are mere
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habit. Those habits could be but are not brou,,ht to lor.al
awareness. It becomes more completely accurate in this
situation to say that men are following rules because
the possibility o± choice is necessarily present.
Unthinking or habitual obedience to law may also
create eventually onormoiis problems for society as well
as the indiviual. As Richard Flathman points out:
Despite its apparent virtues, however, habitual
unreflective conformity with particular rules
'
on the part of any very sizable se.-nient of apopulace can be a source of difficulties. Law,
after all, is an instrument that human boin^js
use to serve their purposes, to assist thorn"in acliieving their objectives. Particuiarlegal rules are ordinarily passed to solve
some problems or meet come need. The sense
that they do so is what lies behind the
sense that they are important and should be
obeyed. When moii conform to them in an
unthinking manner this sense is lost. One
result of such a development is th;<t a sense
of the importance of a law cannot bo con-
veyed to new generations. Since tlie latter
may find the habits of their elders unattrac-
tive, and since the elders have lost the
capacity to defend their own behavior-, con-
flict may develop oetween generatioi;s
.
Similarly, technological and other types of
change may take place that render the laws
inappropriate. Since conformity to the laws
has become unthinking, these changes and/or
their implicatloxis for the laws may go
unnoticed and neither the laws nor the
behavior patterns associated with them will
be changed to adapt to them. The most gen-
eral and most danger'ous oiatcome of such a
situation is the accumulation of social
problems until a crisis is reached, ^9
liichard Flathman, Political Obligation
,
(New York:
Atheneum, I972), p. 59,
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In addition, when authority is above one and rules
are handed down an individual is still in some sense a
means rather than an end. He is a tool of an alien law,
no natter how fair the law may bo. This is the basis
of Rousseau's contention that sovereignty cannot be dele-
eated and that representative covernraent is inadequate.
When the law is a creation of the coimnunity one develops
a deeper coianiitment to the community and the whole struc-
ture of moral discourse because the rules are one's own.
And alonfj these lines, the mere continued existence of
moral codes is no proof of their necessary connection to
the coniraon {;ood, Xn fact v/here moral codes are net the
result of a participant process the moral law is likely
to embody the treatment of some Avithin the community as
moans to others' ends.
The final argument for this view of community also
is connected to the social view of man I have been de-
fendin,^. Human nature develops in society and is an
out^-^rowth of the concepts and institutions of society.
A society, the institutions and ideolo^^y of which are
based on the assumption that man can create his own moi^al
laws will have more chance of functioning in this way and
thus of meeting the full requirements of personhood
r-ketchcd i'.bovc . This is not to say that in an unlimited
eenso wiohinfj makes it so, but there is no ^^ood reason not
119
to proceed fron, the most opti«iistic assumption given the
plausibility of o participant view of n,an.^^
Yet with Rousseau's understanding of the role of soci-
ety anu history in the development of the humaii person-
ality, one who accepts his framework is unlikely to adopt
a revolutionary posture toward existing society. A social
view of human nature makes one reluctant to accept social
transformation within a short time frame. In this view
what vo are if. in part constituted by the institutions
and practices of our society. One can be both a radical
in terms of his appraisal of the ultimate worth of par-
ticular social practices and a reformist in terms of the
immediate changes he is seeking. In fact both perspectives
are necessitated by Rousseau's social view of man. That
Rousseau sustained both positions j.n his o\m practical
work becomes clear from a look at his work on Poland, He
tells us that, "Unless you are thoroughly familiar with
the n;.;tion for v;]iich you are working, the labor done on
its behalf, however excellent in theory, is bound to proye
faulty in practice."
20See William Connolly, "Theoretical Self-Consciousness,
in William Connolly and Glen Gordon, ods
.
, Social Sti-ucturtj
and I'olitic al Tl;.c-'orv, ( Lc-^ington : D, C. Heath Co.7"l97^^^7
and Arnold KaufKiann, "Human Nature cind Participatory
Detnocracy, " in William Connolly, od., The Bias of Pluralism
(N3W York: Atherton, I969).
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Conclusion
In this chapter we have soen that to draw from the
doctrine of man's social nature a view of morality which
argues that a moral code is any set of rules by which
social practices are recul^-ted is inadequate. The in-
adequacy lies on two levels.
In the first place in all cultures moral codes will
have certain forraal graramatical traits. And this fact is
not accidental. It is a consequence of man's moral and
social nature. Moral codes must transcend self-interest
narrowly conceived for this is the purpose of morality
and a requirement of social life. The logical requirements
of reversibility and universability follow froDi this pur-
pose. Thus it beco'.nes possible to criticize certain
practices v/ithin a society as inconsistent with basic
laoral requirements. We do not need to start with the'
presumption that all social practices in a given society
have an adequate reason for existence,
Aiid secondly I have souftht to shov; that ar^^uments can
be advanced to defend criteria by which w© may judge the
content given to the concept of person in various cultures.
Some institutions may be defended in ways consistent with
the formal grammar of moral terms, but an impoverished
notion of the person may be assumed, A recognition of the
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nature of human action, including the notion that man
makes rules and is not a more object, leads to a view of
the participant capacity of individuals. Reco^^^nition of
this capacity provides substantive as well as formal
criteria by which to judf?e societies. It was because
Rousseau was aware of the full consequences of a social
view of man that he could reject an abstract individualist
conception of man and yet find grounds for the rejection
of complete cultural relativism.
In the last chapter I will illustrate some of the
critiques and questions generated by a Rousseauian view
of man and social science. The significance of this
perspective will become more clear by comparing those
few critical perspectives on pluralism within the
utilitarian tradition with tl.oso which a Rousseauian
view generates. In elaborating a participant perspective,
I will examine possible attitudes toward technology, the
structure of government decision making, and the role of
workers in the modern corporation. These themes are all
related and will be tied in with current controversies
about decentrali;;ation
. Lastly I will briefly consider
appropriate strategies of change.
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C H A P T E R VI
HUMAN NATUIiE .\ND CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN DEMOCiUCY
Today it is a commonplace that our modern liberal
welfare otato is under{?oing a crisis of confidence. The
crisis goes beyond any particular set of policies and
touches the nature of our institutions themselves. Yet
the remedies being su^^^ested, especially the most thought-
ful, owe deep intellectual debts to classical political
theory. The growing crisis of liberalism is of course
not primarily a consequence of developments solely within
the intellectual community, but the nature and direction
of responses is often very much affected by one's philo-
sophical debts. These debts are, however, not always
recognized, with the consequence that some of the funda-
raental assumptions dividing the critics of contemporary
practice are not brought out. One critical standpoint
is concerned with the fragmentation of government in-
stitutions and sees currently the demise of a government
of laws. Another major critical tradition, while also
concerned with rule of law, seeks to combine it with
opportunities for genuine participation in government
and Gociety, I will show tViat the first tradition descend
intellectually from Hobbes and Locke, whereas the second
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derives its view of r.;an and society from Kousseau.
The critics Generally take as their starting point
the conviction that pluralism in some sense is an ade-
quate empirical characterization of our society, though
this pluralism is differently interpreted than in the
traditional Dahl-Truman'' mold. Kariel, Bachrach, and
2Wolff see American pluralism as a system which puts
political power into the hands of a few well organized
and traditionally accepted pressure groups, which in
turn are controlled by oligarchies. In other words
modern pltaralism is conservatively biased in two senses.
It favors established groups and within even these groups
real political power is in the hands of insulated group
leaders. Pluralist theory has, follov/ing the lead of
Joseph Schuiiipeter
, redefined democracy as competition
among elites. In its attempt to create a "realistic"
theory of democracy, the radical normative implications
of classical democratic theory have been cast aside and
^ David Truman, The Governmental Process
,
(New York:
Kjiopf, 1951). '
2Henry Kariel, The Promise of P^olitics
,
(Englcwood
Cliffs: Prentice-Ilall, 196077 Peter Bachrach, The Theory
of Democrati c Elitism, (Uoston: Little Bro\/n, 19u7), and
Robert Paul Wolff,
[
i±ie^ i-'overty of Liberalism
,
(i3oston:
Beacon Press, I968),
3See Bachrach, op . cit <> , and Cai'ole Pateman, Partici -
pation aiyl i)oi!iocrat.lc Theory
,
(Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 'l^yoY,
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democracy has been made a conservative doctrine. In
cenoral terms one could characterize Kariel and Bachruch
especially as making a critique of our society on par-
ticipant torns.
Theodore Lowi and Grant McConnell are also disturbed
by the implications of current Anierican pluralist prac-
tice, but they view pluralism and its defects in somewhat
different teruis.^ The principal problem, for them, is
not BO much that interest groups play a role in the niakin,-;
of public policy; rather each private group has appro-
priated unto itself that area of public policy by vhich
it is most ai footed. Thus the railroads and rail unions
have taken over the ICC and large commercial farmers
control the farm program. Lowi and McConnell emphasize
slightly different aspects of the problem. McConnell is
concerned with the practice of grass-roots administration
of federal programs, a practice which usually amounts to
the administration of such policies as farm relief by
local fainnor committees. Within these narrow constituen-
cies it is easy for the most powerful farmers to dominate.
One siDecial poworfui interest is likely to dominate within
Theodore Lov/i, T[he Knd of Liberalism
,
(New York: W.
W, Norton and Co., I969) and Grant McConnell, Private
Power an^ American Democrocy
,
(New York: Alfred A.
Knopf, 1966y.
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a narrow constituency, and thus the American ideal of
errass rootE democracy really means domination by different
powerful special interests.^ Lowi sees the same sort of
process as coininc about at the federal level as well. The
philosophy of interest proup liberalism, which states that
those interests tiost affected by a policy should be
represented in the interior processes of decision making,
has led to a situation where power is delef^ated to ad-
ministrative a^jencies without any clear standard of dele-
gation. The agencies are both confused and lacking in
public understanding, support, or even visibility. They
are easily capturea by the private interests v/ith which
they deal. In the process the public interest is sacri-
ficed. In short, the v/orks of both Lowi and McConnell
heavily stress the loss of the public interest under our
current pattern of policy making. Thus McConnell cites
Instances where public works projects have been carried
out to serve the needs of powerful local construction
companies though at the expense of environmental and
aesthetic concerns. These concerns are shared by all of
us, but v/ithin any one narrow locality these public
concerns are not strong enough to override the demands
of those private firms. Lowi attempts to show that in-
^Op. cit
.
,
McConnell, Ch. k.
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torer.t group liberalism cannot plan and cannot achieve
jvastico. The po^/er of eovernment lends sanction to deci-
sions really made by powerful private concerns. The ICC
enfjafTcs in r. process of case by case barfjaining which
serves the interests of the most powerful railroads.
Federal housin.- policy is taken over by the banks and
real estate firms, with the result that federal policy
has subsidized the white flight from the big cities and
also prevented tho intecration of the new white suburbs.
I do not wish to imply that these critiques of plur-
alism are incompatible or that there is no overlap between
thein. But they differ in emphasis and in basic assumptions,
something which becomes clear when we examine the positive
proposals which emanate from the two perspectives. Differ-
ent concepts are emphasized by the two groups, a fact
which provides a key to the underlying assumptions. To
Kariel, Bachrach, and V/olff, participation and community
are tho terms emphasized. Though the injustices and
conservative biases of the system are clearly recognized,
these are seen as outgrowths of the non-participatory
structure of i^jodorn life. Even if these problems could
be solved without important institutional changes, these
improvements would be regarded as far from satisfactory.
The Iccy concepts underlying the 1/Owi-McConnell criticisms
cire tlie public interest and goveininent of law. And for
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them the concept of the public interest takes on a son.e-
wliat different meaning? than in radical works. It tends to
be equated with diffused or social floods which most of us
want but which will not be satisfied within the confines
of the market. National defense is the classic instance
of such a social good. The term is not used by them to
include devGlopment of a deeper sense of the needs of
others and thus development of one's self through par-
ticipation in a community. I will return to this theme
later.
The importance of this difference in emphasis becomes
obvious when we examine the ways in which the two sides
define the current crisis in legitimacy as well as their
proposed remedies. One of the major themes in Lovri »
3
book is the crisis of confidence in /American institutions.
He repeatedly defines this crisis in terms of the inability
of a fragmented government really to govern, especially its
failure to make clear choices as expressed in unambiguous
laws. The radical critics are bothered by a general lack
of real self-government and participation,
Lowi advocates an effective federal government which
could truly be called a government of law, McConnell
wants to strengt^len the nationalizing tendencies of the
American political system. Federalism wab initially a
compromise rather than an ideal. Its nature has changed
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and can continue to do so. Reforms which vould stren,-then
such institutions as our national parties are needed.
Alonfj siiailar lines Lov/i wants to stop the centrifugal
tendencies within the federal government itself. His
call for juridical democracy is simply a derncmd that
Congress and the administrative agencies themselves re-
verse thoir abdication of responsibility. His principal
criticism is that interer.t groups have beon allowed
participation in the interior processes of decision
making?. He believes that various special interests have
taken over particular a^^encies and reflate themselves
in their ovm interest. Juridical deniocracy would require
of Con^-^ress and the acencies that they make clear laws
rather than allow special interests to bargain ovei"
policies.
Lovri and McConnell both work within a Madisonian
view of politics. Government is to guarantee equal
rights for all, and it can do this best in a situation
whe3:'e there are multiple competing interest groups. They
suppoi^t a pluralist politics when many groiips can be in
the ar&na all the time. Powerful special interests will
cancel each other out and formal political leadership
will then be able to fashion policies in the public
interest. This view stresses the role of formally elected
elites and identifies legitimate government basically
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with policy outcomes. It also assumes and accepts as
inevitable the self-interes tedness of groups, which are
thou,oht to be composed of the self-interested individuals
who benefit from then,. Little thought presumably is e;iven
to the structure of these groups as long as there is a
relatively balanced competition among them. Unlike llobbes
there is no assumption that government's only legitimating
task is to preserve order; government can secure certain
positive conditions for the private development of all.
But there is no assumption that political society has a
role in the development of full moral and communal sense
of the individual. The lack of any ccncern with problems
of human development and political socialization is
conspicuous in both Lowi and McConnell.
Both Lowi and McConnell are completely opposed to any
response to the current crisis which involves decen-
tralization and community control. Lowi explicitly
attacks the poverty war for its attempt to solve the
problems of poverty by giving the poor some power in the
administration of programs intended to benefit them. The
effect, cis he sees it, is to create one more area of
public policy to be appropriated by a private group. Lowi
remarks that there will be time enough to decentralize
once a public interest has been established and articulated
in public policy. Again his primary interest seems to be
130
the consistency and clarity of public policy outcomes. To
Give urban renewal or housin,- policy to city government
is to make these policies the prero^^atives of the local
real estate and construction industries.
It is at this point that the dispute between Lowi and
the other £?roup of political scientists and new left
critics becomes the most apparent. They would argue, and
I think correctly, that Lowi has only partially understood
the present crisis in legitimacy. Especially in the
ghettoes there has emerged a black consciousness which
wishes to express itself through development of a different
life style and control over the immediate aspects of their
lives. This emerging consciousness is in part a reflection
of ineffective and unjust national policies, but it is
inadequate to regard it solely in this light, for it
expresses a deeper aspect of the human personality neglected
by Lockian and Madisonian theory, the desire to be botind
by laws of one's ov/n making.
The new left critics call for a participant society.
The crisis of legitimacy roust be resolved by turning
important powers over schools, housing, police forces to
smaller scale political units where more direct individual
participation by the affected individuals will be possible.
The suggestion that industry be democratized is also an
important part of this program. In some authors tiiis
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moans control over day-to-day working arrangements and
discipline. In others it means actual control of all
important corporate decisions.^
Now it is in the spirit of Rousseau's concern for
moral and conniuhal development that modern theories of
decentralization and participation have been developed.
Such theorists as Bachrach and Kariel feel that the modern
concept of democracy has lost an important dimension.
The aim of Rousseau was to provide a set of institutions
in v/hich full participation would be possible and thus
moral development would occur. Policy outcomes provide
only one perspective in this participant theory. As in
the case of both Plato and liousseau, modern participant
theory seeks the creation of institutions which fit man's
full developmental potential. The assumption of par-
ticipant theory is that the participant community makes
possible man's full humanity. Community fosters the
mutual recof^rnition of individuals as persons, that is,
as beings who develop moral codes based on a recognition
of the needs of others and of the community as a whole.
Men learn to treat each other as subjects and freely
choose to live by a moral law.
^Op . ci
t
. , Carole Pateman,
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Obviously these two critiques of modern pluralism are
in tension with each other. It may be possible to iiuacine
a constructive dialo/jue between them, but such a dialogue
can be rewardiufT only when each side fully recognizes the
strength or the other. Each riiust deal with the other's
strongest case. And this A/ill come about only when all
sides become clear about the ways in which conceptions of
human nature are implicit in this debate.
Lowi's whole argument is couched in terms of the
effects on public policy outcomes of interest group
liberalism. And undor interest group liberalism he include
such proposals as the devolution to local authority of
major policy initiatives,
Kariel and Bachrach are concerned with the individual'
alienation from the political process and even day-to-day
life. They focus on sucli facts as the political apathy
©f the average American, To Lowi and McConnell this is
not a problem as long as the average citizen is benefitting
from satisfactory governmental policies.
In assessing Lowi's critique of contemporary American
democracy it is important to keep in mind that he remains
within the limits of a basically pluralist approach. His
call for juridical democracy is really a reciuest tliat the
system become more fulJy pluralist. As in the case of
all pluralists, the doctrine operates for him both as an
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ideal and as the basis for a description oT the system.
His picture ol' current ilmerican politics is one of various
groups each pushing for its own immediate interest. Out
of the conflict of such groups, at least when the conflict '
is as wide as possible, will eraerf^e policies which provide
the maxiinum satisfaction of the largest number of groups.
Lowi ' s conception of American politics and his
projected ideal are tied to a view of human nature far
different from Kariel's and Dachrach's. His is the sort
of atomistic, a-social view of human nature which is
characteristic of the liberal tradition as far back as
Ilobbes, The view is that men are self-interested atoins--
tliey are born with a well defined set of innate needs or
desii^es, such as for power, property, security. Society
exists for and is created by the quest of men to fulfill
these needs. The individual person, embodying these
developed interests, needs, and purposes is not only
morally but logically and temporally prior to society and
the state.
His conception of human nature includes no theory of
moral development within society. In a discussion praising
Madison's Fodorali st number ten, Lowi argues tliat we must
assume that groups will always pursue their self-interest.
Madison in Federalist 10 defined the group
("faction") as a "number of citizens, whether
amounting to a majority or minority of the
13^
whole, who are united and actuated by some
coniiiion impulse or passion, or of interest,
advorse to the ri,'Tht of othor citize ns, or
iiL« poriiiancnt /nui av:VTrc^:at e int ore-st
s'
^f
iJi£ £2ijliir[i£liiv . (liiiiphasis 'added. ) Uavid
Trum^ui uses ivadisons's definition but cuts
the quotation just before the emphasizod
part. In such a manner pluralist tlieory
boca'ne the complete handmaiden of interest
group liberalism.
. .To the Madisonian.
,
.groups were necessary evils much in need
of ref^ulation. To the modern pluralist
(groups are /rood; they require accommodation,
. ,
A revived feeling of distrust toward interests
and groups would not destroy pluralist theory
but would only prevent its remaining a servant
of a completely outmoded system of public
endeavor.
, .Such distrust of prevailing
theory might then lead to discomfort with
tho jurisprudence of delegation of power,
for it too rests mightily upon an idealized
view of how groups hiake law today,?
While one might not wish to quarrel with Lewi's statement
as an assessment of how present day interest groups
actually'' function, what is noteworthy is his assumption
that groups must always behave this way. He does not
consider the possibility that groups and individuals
might move beyond a narrov/ self-interest under the
right forms of social life, and he cannot consider this
possibility because he has no conception of human devel-
opment in a social context. Human beings are merely
creatures of a given self-interest.
'^
Op. c it
.
,
Lowi, pp. 296-297.
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Lowi's policy proposals unite an abstract individ-
ualist viev.' of man with the conviction that social science
can yield the same sort of refjularities as those in the
natura;i sciences. If one channels enough interests into
the political process they will cancel each other out in
such a way that the public interest will inevitcibly emerge.
Simple alterations of the system can produce automatic
changes. Lowi is in effect assuminfj law like regularities
in the system, an assumption made e^isier by a conception
of a fixed human nature.
Such political tlieoi^ists as Bachrach and Kariel derive
from Kousseau assumptions about human nature contrary to
those of Lo'^/i , Man is not an isolated atom with a set
of given interests and needs x^rhich exist apart from society.
Rather man becomes what he is within a social structure.
Society in larf?o measure constitutes his make-up. lie
learns a language and a set of roles and from these he
learns his needs and purposes. He learns what good and
evil are. Apart from ur before the existence of society
men are not good or evil, for they have no conception of
these.
Men in any society are not therefore atoms of self-
interest. They have roles and act in terms of the con-
ception of them.sclvos developed in their socially created
roles. This does not moan that they never act in ways we
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would want to call self-interested. But even what ^oes
under the label self-interest is in part constituted by
the conception of rnnn developed within a social framework.
Tlie quest for property is sornethinff wo learn as v.e learn
language and roles, for the forms of property differ in
various societies. iln individual learns who he is and
what his self-interest is as he learns his social role.
Dachrach derives from iiousseau the recognition that
the existence of society depends upon nsen who have a sense
of rif;ht and wron^. Men must have learned who they are,
includinf^ thoir duties to society at large. Man is a
creature who follows rules he learns in society rather than
a programmed being who follows his preformed desires.
Society cannot exist without certain general moral
rules, Rousseau does not believe that the existence of
morality is a mere matter of convention or that moral
codes guarantee efficiency in the pursuit ©f pleasure,
as did Hume. Like Kant he believed that there are cer-
tain basic criteria which any moral system will meet and
this must necessarily be the case. Morality is that
higher order system of rules which provides a standard
above self-interest and thus guarantees the existence
of society as such.
Rousseau did not of course believe that any existing
society was fully developed morally. Men did not recog-
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the breadth or the extent of their dependence on others
and or. society in ^ener^a. Thus while rocofrnizin;: some
duties to other men, they were always tryin- to take
advantage oT them in amne aspects of their lives. Our
institutions do not make us fully conscious of the needs
of others as complete human boin^-s
. In some aspects and
relcitionships others become objects for our use. Rousseau
knew that Ilobbes was not completely wronf^. Only the
problem was that hobbos described the modern bourgeois
individual socialized to limited moral awareness and
certain forns of self-interested competition with his
fellows.
Rousseau recof^nized that the fully developed moral
person emer{^es from the proper process of moral decision-
makinc:. An understanding of the concept of the fjeneral
will in Rousseau makes this point clear. Rousseau argued
that one is le^^itimat e ly bound only by the general will,
V.'o have seen that in his analysis of the general
will Rousseau makes tw^o significant points. He believes
that the good society is one where all men are clearly
aware of their moral dutie.s to others. Fully to follow
rules, which is part of being social, is not merely to
folloAv tliem from habit but to understand and follow them
from leflective choice. The r.econd related argument is
that men acliievo this full moral development (and in fact
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t-liis is part of his conception of moral development) when
they create the most in.portnnt rules which euidc their
society. Men f.ain the clearest conception of themselves
as social bein.^s, includin^^ ex fxxll sense of the depth of
their ties to other persons, Avhen they participate with
their fellows in the creation of laws which affect all.
The dispute between Lowi and Bachrach involves
fundamentally different conceptions of human nature.
Lowi can be less concei-ned with widening opportunities
for participation because he sees human nature as an
abstract Kivon entity. As long as the desires people have
now are beiiig iaa'c things are fine and there is no neces-
sity for participation. What people feel now is an
expression of a given human nature. Bachrach believes
that people are social beings who learn who they truly
are and what their real needs are only when they par-
ticipate fully in political life. iiachrach criticizes
Dahl, and his argument is equally applicable to Lowi, for
treating participation as dispensable \.hen one is alretidy
getting what he wants from society.
Dahl fails
. . .to conceive of political
participation two-dimensionally : as
instrumentality to obtain end results and
as a process thtit affords h±in the oppor-
tunity to gain a greater sense of purpose
and pride in himself and a greater awareness
of cotii!iiunity
. In jiousseauian tcri:i3, Dahl
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hc-is lailecl to consido:c pcirt icl pat ion as aprocess throu-h which man can becone a
nu'ster of hiruaelf .^^
Throuf.^h participation people develop a new sense of
needs, such as for fellowship, conmmnal pleasures, and
joint participation and intellectual development itself.
As social beincs our needs do not remain constant. The
satisfaction of these communal needs comes to mean more
to people than those earlier needs felt before political
participation. Thus political participation is not one
^ood whoso value can be compared in utilitarian terms
with other coods, because it is a process or way of life
which chances our perception of all tjoods. It is in other
words a ^^ood in itself.
While I believe t}iat tlie stron^i;er philosophical case
can be built for sonjo version of Rousseau's social view
of man, in the next part of this essay I will confine
myself to showin;^ that a more fruitful debate between the
policy proposals espoused by eacli side becomes possible
when we reco^jnize clearly the depth and origin of the
"paradifjm" dispute we face here. While I will proceed
from basicalJy Rousseauian as suinptions , I think it possible
to learn more from other positions when we are self-
conscious about our own and our opponents basic per-
Peter Dachrach, "Interest, Participation, and Demo-
cratic Theory," (Unpublished paper).
spectives,
Lowi can so easily equate participation and doceii-
tralization v.ith devolution to conventional units or local
government or cooptation or local elites because he is not
concerned with hunan development and does not see that this
is one principal concern of the new left critics. Thus
neither he nor McConnell sees that the New Left want to
restructure local decision making bodies in such a way that
the power traditional elites, or of any elite, will be
minimized. A set of procedures, to be discussed below,
should be desie-ned to maximize the opportunities of
persons to participate in decisions which most affect them.
This is neither cooptation of favored local people, v/ith
its conservative impact, nor transfer of power to traditional
local bureaucracies. Smaller more homog-eneous constituencies
will be created within lar^c cities and in these constit-
uencies real attempts to institutionalize the partic-
ipation of all will bo made.
Decentralization in this sense will not fully please
Lowi because it could cause some fra^^ment ation of policy,
but his lack of concern for development leads him not to
consider these chanf^es in the radical notion of decen-
tralization and what they hope to achieve. Thus he
cannot woifjh tlio costs of possible policy frafjmenttition
a{?ainst the /vains of human development. Jlis lack of concern
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for ouestions of hu,-.,an aevelop.ont is also reveulc-d in uis
inadequate perspective on the en,er«ence of the public
AS wo have s.en, Lowi is woxriod that an effective
pro,,ran. of decentralization would fragment an already
divided nation, and one would ri,,htly i..,,ine that in such
a climate a public interest could not be developed.
I do not see any ea.,y resolution to this dilemma,
but a number of points are relevant. In the first place
son,e of the reforms su^Tf^ested by Lowi and McConnell could
make for easier development of true national policies, such
as welfare reform and environ.nental laws. But I am convinced
that such laws will be easier to pass and implement if
they are at least in part the result of public interest
politics. We need the einerf^^ence of more and stronger
public interest groups, to borrow a term from Schatt-
schneider.9 The many ties between government and business
and the concentrated power of h±c: business''^ make it far
easier for people to organize on the basis of occupational
groups for the sake of private advanta^^e
. In addition a
prevailing- ethos which rer;ards the pursuit of private
9E, E. S chat t Schneider, The Somi-Soveroifrn People
.
(NewYork: Holt, ifinehart, and Winston, lyoO), Ch
. TT"^
I' or a dir.cussxon of these ties see John Kenneth
Galbraitli, J^conoinics ajrui the Public Purpo.se
. ( Boston:
Houf^hton Mifflin Co., I973 ) ,
lh2
monetary advantaco as natural contributes to the sanio
effect. It is the f;reat strength of the Rousseauist
tradition to recof.nize that in the proper institutional
setting- nion can learn to have other brotidor concerns.
A major problem with both pluralism and Lowi is that
a concern for policy outcomes has obscured consideration
of the political potential v/hich produces those outcomes.
A developed political community ctvn grow throu^^h partic-
ipation and provide the thrust for new pro^^rams. While
too extreme a level of participation, such as unwillingness
to listen to experts, can be a threat to effective solutions,
the problem today is to find a constituency at all concerned
with public interest problems.
One reason for the lack of interest by political
scientists and other commentators in problems of partic-
ipation and human development has been a paradifira amon^^
historians which associates the rise of totalitarianism
with extreme levels of political particpation , Yet
writinf^ durin^^ the thirties, John Dewey made some sugges-
tive remarks which indicate the possibility of covering
the disturbing facts oT Nazi Germany with another theo-
retical perspective at least equally convincing. Democ-
racy fell in Germany not because there was too much of it
Ik3
but because it ^.as not part of the fabric of daily lifej^
If wc con offer equally plausible and more potentially
optiniotic explanations of political extremism,
.ve have a
strong case for advising political scientists to work
on the basis of paradie:ms which assume the potential for
human development. For what human nature can accomplish
is in part a consec.uence of the way we view it and the
social institutions which are an outgrowth of our beliefs. ""^
The indications of voter irrationality in the behaviorist
literature should be seen not as proof of man's irre-
versible irrationality, but as inadequacies fostered by
the present system beyond which individuals cam develop.
We should be chastened by the recognition that no remedial
action in the form of ijis ti tutional engineering can be
final, but that human beings can transcend present social
evils.
We are left with the conclusion that a constituency
^^Jolm Dewey, "Democracy and Educational Administration,"
iiOii S'^ci(ity. Vol. 23, (April, I937).
12William Connolly, "Theoretical Self-Consciousness
, In
William Connolly and Glen Gordon, eds., Social Structure and
Political Theory
.
(Lexington: D. C. ileatii and Co., 197^)
and Arnold ivaufmann, "JIuman Mature and Participator Democ-
racy," in Connolly, ed., Th_c t)ias oi^ i>luralisn]
.
(New York:
Atherton Press, I969),
CDee especially Angus Campbell et al.
,
The Ameri crm
Voter
,
(New York: Wiley, I960).
for the public interest must eiiierfje atnonfr men vho in their
immediate livos have had some opportunity to see problems
from more tlian a self-interested point of view. Koussoau,
and Tocouevillo niter himj^ have recognized that local
political participation is t}ie key to the development of
such consciousnecs. Participation thus may have some role
in the restructuring- of national politics. The emergence
of local political consciousness could provide the lever
for reform, .-.nd Lov;i • s vork is (juite lackinp; as to the'
potential sources of reform enerf^y.''^ And even if Lowi • s
reforms wore mag^ically instituted, \ve cannot assume that
the politics of juridical democracy would insure a stron^ver
place for the public interest. Bringing; all interests
into the national arena and hoping; for the emergence of the
public interest seems to be a modern version of Adam
Smith's wonderful \Jorld. To hope that the blind self-
intei-est of all t} ese groups will produce farseeing
results is a kind of naive optimism on which we had better
not count.
On the othor hand it must be admitted that Bachrach
and others have slid ratlier easily past the question of the
14Alexis clc Tocqueville, j JcMiiocr;\C3^ in America , ed. by
Max Lorner and J, P. Mayer, (Ncv; York; Harper and iiow,
1966).
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effects of increased decentralization and participation
In our type of society, for even decentralization of the
sort they envisa.ve will create problems; and to bring about
such decentralization will itself be a ve.y problematic •
process. Their correct recognition of the need for more
opportunities for self-develop.nent obscures these aspects
of the problem. It is of course a commonplace that our
society is hifjhly interdependent and structurally cen-
tralized. There are risks that in many policy areas we
would have to pay a hi^h cost for the wrong decisions by
various local communities. And in fact self-development
at the local level will not be possible if rniniir.al eco-
nomic prerequisites are not g-uaranteed. And one must also
ask whether and how effective decentralization can be
broufjht off at all in our kind of society.
It seems to me that the insights of a Rousseauian
perspective allow the transcendence or synthesis, in a
Hof^elian sense, of both sides of this debate. I3ecause
he was so strongly aware of the social nature of man,
Rousseau's concern for self-development never led him
to advocate simplistic repudiation of the existing
society. He was not the sort of radical to exclaim: "Burn
it all down and start all over again!" In his work on
existing societies he recognized that his ideals could
never be fully attained. And he knew that reform pi-oposals
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would have to embody compromises with existing? injustices.
He argued, for example, that serfs in Poland could not
be immediately freed because they Avere not ready for the
responsibilities of froedon. Some program of gradual
emancipation was necessaryJ ^ But Jiousseau also knew that
his ideal was nonetheless relevant as a standard by v/hich
to jud^^e existing- societies and as a guide to directions
for reforms. Rousseau was free of the illusion of so many
contemporary political theorists who assume that ideals
which cannot be easily and quickly implemented are
irrelevant, "merely" Utopian faninsies.
A full Rousseauian perspective will then transcend
excessive obeisance to existing society and a simplistic
utopiariisra. It will do this through a two pronged attack
by advocating a set of specific reforms which could at
least eventually be achieved in some degree within the
political system and then by encouraging the development
of other "ne^^r culture" alternatives outside conventional
politics. These tv/o prongs of the attack are and must
1
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be complementary.
Let me begin first with the more practical political
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, "Considerations on tlie Govern-
ment of Poland," in Frederick l.atkins, ed,, Po litcal Ur_itinr;3
of Jean-Jr'cques J^oussoau
,
(Edinburgh; Nelson^ 1933)
,
pp. 159-187.
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Though I do not exactly follow him, I have gained
insights from Pliilip Slater, The Pursuit of ]>onelincB3
,
(Host on: Beacon i^iess, 1970),
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side or the attack. (Though I am not in.plyin^ that the
political will to implement these proposals is here or can
be immediately generated.)
In the first place some aspects of Levi's j^iridical
democracy are useful even from the perspective of a more
participant orientation to politics. The tenure of
statutes proposal and the requirement that Congress rather
than administrative agencies make laws^^ are useful in that
they may force interest groups and their le^iders to deal
with Congress and thus become more public. Proposals
which will force interest group leaders to deal with each
other and Congress as openly as possible cire to be en-
couraged because making the process of interest group
dealings more public will put pressure on the leaders to
reform their own organizations in the direction of greater
rosponsiveneos to membership. i3ut in saying this we must
remember that Congressional Committees themselves all too
easily have developed tacit ties to special interests. This
suggests that Lowi • s reforms can be more effective when
part of a general reform of Congress itself.
There are other obviouf.i ways in v/hich federal policy
can be effective and is in fact absolutely necessary in
18
.Op
. ci t
.
,
Lowi, Ch. 10,
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foMterinr; a nore participant society. Rousseau correctly
recofrni>.ed t)mt men who were Tinancially enslaved to others
could not participate as full independent beings in the
dovelop..ent of the .general will. On one level this insi^^ht
can be pressed into a full critique of the capitalist
economic system; but at the level of contemporary politics
it needs to be pressed toward continuin^j demands for tax
reform. One of the thin/'.s which the federal f^overnnient
±3 uniquely equipped to do is to collect taxes in an
efficient manner. The tax system needs to be pushed errad-
ually toward {jroater income equality. And part of this
must be profcrams for cuaranteed annual incomes. Truly
ptirticipant communities cannot be created by men who are
worried about where their next meal is coming- from.
Equally important to the development of community is a
reasonable de^jree of national economic stability. This
means the control of inflation and the avoidance of severe
economic downturns. In an interdependent economy effective
federal power will also be needed for this purpose, and
experience has shown that an interest ;^;roup liberal a[)proach
to prices and wa^;-e policy is inadequate.
But stable communities doend upon more than minimal
price fluctuations. One aspect of modern society which
militates a,';ainst stability is rapid technolof^icnl chanfjc
and technolojr^i cal unemployment, historically our tax
1^9
pcTlicy has favored technoloc-ical innovation, allowing;
corpor.itions larf^o v/ritc ofxr. for investment in new
technology.
.Jut the concern lor ever expanding,- economic
abundance leads us to pursue technolo^_^y wlxcrever it leads. '
The quGGtion of abundance for v.hat is not asked. Ways of
life and coiurnunities are constantly disrupted and tlie pace
of technolop;ical change severs the crenerations and increase
the already patholo/;ical fixation on youth in our culture.
Technology and abundance need to be subordinated to a
concern for human happiness, and federal econonic policy
can play a role here by ceasing to encourage those
technological innovations which can oe justified solely
by increased productivity, corporate profits regardless of
damage to the social and natural environment.
Participant reforms must also involve the large
corporation more directly than in matters of tax policy.
If federal policy must create the proper context for
participation, it must also open up opportunities for
participation of both a geographic and functional sort.
It is becoming increasingly difficult today to deny
that tiie large corporation is a public, political entity.
Government policy should be chiinged by requiring fedei'al
19There are uany statements of this tlieiDe
.
Among them
is Michael iicagan, Tiro i'i;jnaged JCconomy
,
(Wew York: t)xford
University Press, I903),
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charters for private corporations, and a major condition
for the granting of such charters would be that corporation:
include effective mechanisms for the representation of
consumers and workers in their decision makinr: processes.
This is far from a full answer to the problems created by
the corporate capitalist structure of our economy but it
is an effective first step which will ^jive many more
persons the chance to pai-^ticipate in decisions having
a larc-e effect on their daily lives. There will need to
be considerable exporirnen tation as to the forms which this
will take so as to minimize the role of now workers and
consur-ier elites. Represent ativo bodies ^^rill have to play
a role, but ima^^inativo uses of committees and provisions
for mandates, recalls, and public meetings can mitifjate
the undesirable effects of representation. Especially
at this level of the individual plant local study g:roups
and political action groups can begin two-way communication
with leadership as well as manage some of the more immed-
20late plant concerns.
It may seeir, to some that these proposals v^^ill result
in a decline in economic efficiency for the American
20
.
Nxlfj Elvander, "Democracy und Largo Organizations,"
in Gideon Sjoberg and M, Donald Hancock, eds., i'olitcs
in the Po s t-V/e Ifare S t at e
,
(New York: Columbia University
Press, 1 972), p. 31^+
.
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corporation. This is certainly true in that it will at
least to son,e extent generate a concern about the effects
of technolo,,y on the worker qua worker. The proposals
seem more reasonable when we realize that demand for the
"
continuing, hi^h levels of production is only n.ade possible
by an artificially induced levels of demand. Automation
and technolo^Tical progress already have created problems
about unemployment, and only increased public sector spen-
ding; in th-3 area of personal services, such as for teachers,
social workers, etc., can be^in to alleviate our unemploy-
ment problems. American economic development is at a
point where decent comfort can be assured without continuin/5
the obsessive concern for increased corporate efficiency.
Thus far it would seem tliat my reform proposals for
the creation of a more participant society have entailed
the creation of a more powerful federal fjovernment
. This
is correct because decentralized prrticipant communities
stand any chance of working- only in the proper context,
and federal power properly used is one of the most impor-
tant instruments for the creation of that context.
Federal policy must also directly make possible
increased participation at the local level. If we examine
21 See Michael jlarrinfcton , "The Politics of Poverty," in
Irvinfc ITo\/e, ed., The j^adical Papers
,
(New York: Doubleday,
1965). ^'
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local co.,r.unit:i.cs we i'lnd that they face decisions about
zonin,,, the education of their children, the regulation
of industries in their boundaries, the administration of
their, police, the construction of new houses and recreation
facilities. Lhen we cx-::i,ine this list of issues and
functions, ^mich does not purport to be cor.plete, we will
see that important distinctions need to be made. In the
present state of our economy it is inconceivable that
some of tho areas should be handled primarily at the "
local level. The social costs would be too enormous. The
task of re^ulatinf; pollution must be federal because
corporations go beyond the boundaries of local neif^hbor-
hoods, and because local regulation A/ould allow corpor-
ations to play off one community against another in the
pursuit of the lowest bidder. The regulation of pollution
has a direct effect upon society and failure to perform
this task adequately will bo catastrophic in its results.
But there are other areas on this list where the
results of the policy adopted will have a direct and
immediate imptict mainly on the local community. The local
community will have to pay the largest and most immediate
price for failure to educate its children properly or
adequately design public housing, recreation and urban
ronev;al. I am not suggesting that decisions here will
have no impact on the larger metropolitan .oixja or the nation
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as a whole. In our kind of society there are no such areas;
but where tho direct brunt of the decision must be borne
by the local community, a concern for human development
dictates that responsibility for these decisions be delc-
f-^ated to that community. And by this I do not mean that
urban renewal, education, etc., be delegated to existincv
city governments, whicli is the net result of current
revenue sharing. These functions must be turned over to
truly local neighborhoods so that decisions will be made
by people who have some sense of daily relationships to
each other. I do not have ))rccise formulas for the
achievement of this goal, but federal programs should
begin to carry as requirements local plans for effective
decentralization. Educational assistance can require the
creation of local neighborhood school boards; urban
renewal projects can include the right of veto to groups
immediately affected in the ghetto.
When we "decentralize" to cities as a whole, these
constituencies may indeed be dominated by large private
firms, lJut such need not be the case when functions are
turned over to many smaller areas, including ghetto
communities, A large number of such constituencies cannot
be controlled by small, localized affluent groups « De-
centralization will dislodge those traditional elites.
It may be true, as Grant McCoiniell has charged, that
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vithin tho sir.all constituency thei^e is a danr;er that
policy will bo inadG by elites not responsive to a lar^^cr
national interest. What ia required is that decisions
dofinirfc t!ii3 lar.Ter public (yood be made in broad constit-
uencies but tli.it there also be areas for important decisions
by smaller constituencies. The proposals here lor
neichborhood ^^overniiient and for changes in corporate
structure reflect this outlook by extendinf: some space,
both f^eofjraphic (local nci{^hbor)iOods ) and functional
(corporations) for decisions v/hich affect the group
sic:nificcintly and yet will not undermine the public
interest. Certain very fTeneral policies crucial to .the
whole nation and yet beyond the scope of any one area, such
as environmental protection, will inevitably be the
prerof^ative of central authoi^ity, but v/orkers at the
plant level should have the opportunity to have a say
in the structuring of their work lives and local neif^h-
borhoods should have a say in redesigning theii" neighbor-
hoods and the schools and public facilities vv'ithin them.
Decisions ninde by such constituencies in these areas
will have only a marginal impact on the public interest
as conceived by Lowi and McConnell. Indeed, providing
this kind of opportunity could strengthen concern \/ith
the public intei^cst because, as Oaclirach points out, many
people ar'o often apatiietic about larger political events,
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but they will learn the importance of politics when they
begin to understand that politics can have a bearing; on
their lives. A less apathetic electorate can provide the
basis for n.ore effective definitions of the public interest
by representative bodies.
In this connection it should also be pointed out that
within a new coi^porate structure a loss alienating for.,, of
work life could become a possibility, and workers who have
been allowed to develop more fully in their work are
less likely to be manipulated by elites in their work or
neighborhood life. This will also .minimize the dangers
of power in small constituencies. Andre Gorz su^;ge3t3
that workers who are given or who gain some chance to
affect their job situation can and should try to control a
number of specific areas. These should include the
training schools, so that workers may have more than one
skill. Control over the speed and rhythm of work should
be sought as well as over the kind of new techniques to
2?bo introduced.
Alienating work life has so dulled the capacities of
many workers that they leave their jobs able only to
indulge the pursuit of tiiose pleasures programmed for them
22Andre Gorz, A btrategy for Labor
,
(Boston: Beacon
Press, 1967), pp. ^rj-hh.
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by corporate giants. Only if the problem of alienation is
adec.uatcly dealt vit>. can we be^in to fjuarantee that par-
ticipation at the noifThborhood level will be vs widespread
as possible.
In carryinfT out decentralization to the local coninun-
ities, a nurr,ber of practical problems and potential dangers
must be faced. We must first consider the size of local
areas within larfye cities that wo will create. The size
of the local community must be small enouf^h to increase
sifrnificantly chances for individual participation and yet
larfje enou,-h so that decisions will not be trivial. Large
cities must not be so fx^agmented that coordination arjon^-
subunits will be extremely difficult. ICxperience will
provide some clues about how to weifjh different factors.
Ethnic, historic and ,-oographic factors should bo taken
into account in defining the neighborhood areas.
How will these neighborhoods be governed? As men-
tioned before we must design a set of procedures which
will give as many people as possible a chance to participate
directly in political decisions. We can imagine a small
elected council having responsibility for the ongoing
administration of police, sanitation, scliools, v/cll'are.
There arc several essays on the ()rc>bleiiis of defining
neighborhoods in Terrence E, Cook and Patrick M. Morgan,
edjj,, P.-i.rtici pnt ory ivci.iocracy
,
(San Francisco: Canfield
Press, 1971) .
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would have the rorcc oT law and be bindin. on the council.
Furthern,ore, council n,en.bers can themselves be regionally
elected. This will foster direct co.n.unicat ion between
very small ,>roups of citizens and political leadership.
The ,,eneral intent of these practical suf,,,es tions is to
blond direct denocratic participation with representation
in such a way that men have alienated their sovereif.nty
neither to a representative elite nor to an elite of
those fanatics who have the patience to endure Ion,; neetincs.
These susfrestions also recognize that leadership and ex-
pertise n,ust have a role in a^.y successful organi^ation
, but
there is a vast difference between experts and leaders, who
must use their talents to serve the common good and those
who define their values as the common good. With these
proposals even those individuals who choose minimal in-
volvement will still feel closer to politics. Those xvho
make decisions affecting them will inevitably be in much
closer contact v.-ith their immediate friends.
These proposals arc not, however, without risk and
are not guarjmtocd to end apathy. Some neighborhoods may
yet be taken over by unrepresentative fanatics; but these
costs must be weighed against tlie need for ghetto
communities especially to develop self-awareness and
respect. Failure can bo a salutary lesson and the costs
must also be weighed against the mounting failure of
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State and city authorities niay set certain minimum standards
of perfornance, though problems may arise as to what
constitutes minimum standards and what is undue inter-
rcro:(co. This loceii council may bo given lefi-islative
power, but we arc here f.-.ccd x.'ith the recurrent problem
of delegation of responsibility. It would seem impossible
to do away with representation at the local level because,
as Walzor points out, most people do not want to be
political all the time. This is especially the case in
a society where work is dull and deadening, as we can
expect it to be for some time to come. But perhaps the
representative principle at the neif^hborhood level can be
qualified in a number of ways. Committees in individual
subject areas con be appointed, with additional members
comin^^ from all interested citizens. The committee would
be fully responsible to the elected representatives, but
those with a real desire to participate would have the
chance to be lieard. In addition, referenda and town
meetinfjs could be a possibility: a specified perconta^je
of local voters would have the ri(jht to request either.
Decisions throufch a town meetinfj with an adequate quorum
2h
Micliael iJalzer, "A Day in the Life of a Socialist
Citizen," in Irvin{; ilowe
,
ed.. Beyond the New Left .
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white liberalism to deal with the educational and other
problems of the slums.
Tlicse proposals will mean that individuals in their
corporate and noi^:;hborIxo:,d life v.ill have some ch.Mnco to
participate in the decisions the consequences of v^hich
will have a clear impact on them. But no full scale
abrofration of federal power is being su^,vve s ted
. The
federal frovernment will continue to reculato the most
pervasive social forces, such as the corporation. The'
federal courts will enforce civil ri^rhts and guarantees
to minority groups. And federal power will be needed to
provide a proper environment for these changes. Federal
policy must bo coordinated so that in as many related
areas as possible people will have direct responsibility
for the decisions aflecting them. A cluster of related
functions would go to each neighborhood area. Increased
opportunities for participation in related areas plus a
larger public sector (more money for public parks, schools,
etc.) will help to foster a more participant view of man
and life, When the stakes involved arc not great and only
an isolated policy Iiore and there affected we cannot expect
people to develop a commitment to participation.
These reforms arc difficult to achieve, and political
will is required. But those changes within the system, if
they arc to become more feasible and point toward a fuller
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cluuir:.. in tho nature of American life, require activities
of a utopiaTi sort by those "outside" the system. It seems
to me that a full Uousseauian perspective would point in
the s:r.uc additional directions. The nature of this further
perspective uccoirios nore clear when x^e consider the in-
adequacies of tho reforms proposed, even could they be
fully imi)leniented
,
Modern Ainerican corporations are very larf^o and the
nature of tho work lije extremely alienatinfj. Proposals
to make corporations more fully participant may alleviate
some of the wor:;t features of work, hut a tr'uly non-
alienatinf-: liic would require a sinaller scO.e technology.
At present there is a strong; need for f^roups "outside" the
system to demonstrate tho feasibility of a smaller scale
and decentralized teclaiolocy
. They will show that
human bcin^js can produce enough to live in decent comiort
without becomiui^? specialized appenda^^^es of tlie macliino
,
The size and tVGo,-graphic dispersion of corporations means
that their fjovernments will likely become representative,
pluralist structures with most individuals still having
all to little say in some of tho most important decisions.
In addition it is one of the paradoxes of alienation that
25Questions of the feasibility of smaller scale tocli-
nolof^y are discussed iji C. Geor;;:e 'ieneilo and Jjimitri
iioujiHopoulis
,
eda., Tlio C as o for' Partici[)atory iJcmocracy
,
(I'Jcw York: (Jrossman I'ublishors, lyyi)
.
161
we cnnot e.xpeot alienated
.en to Ue able to fully en-
visage, alternatives to exi.tln« urran«e,„ents
. The ways
in which a ,„ore fulfilling worlc life „,ay compensate for
the endless spiral of naterlal accu...ulation will not
.e
fully apparent to tliem.
Another inadequacy of the proposed roforns is the
sort of connnunities they would create. These communities
would often be lacking i„ two respects: thoy are not
intorgonerational and there is a separation of work and
leisure. 2^ The individuals with when, I associate in
..y
work life are often not the same persons I know in my
noichborhood. Ve are fragmented and relate to others in
fragmented ways. And both suburbia and corporations are
generationally segregated. Our relationships with the
next generation and the previous one are Infrequent a^d
superficial and thus the sort of connnunity which can
exist is insufficient. Such psychologists as Eric
Erickson have pointed out that a secure sense of
personal identity derives in part from these inter-
generational relationships. 27 V/e can face the fact of
The effects of this kind of separation are consideredby Kenneth Keniston, The Uncommitted
. (New York- DellPublishing Co., i960). ^
27Erik Erikson has dealt with the need for intergener-
ational community in Ch ile]hood and Society. (New York-Norton, 1950). ~
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our ovn death Iocs traumatica lly when ve hnvo close ties
to our children and tvrandchi Idren
, and death and afjein.^-
to thorn is neitiier so .uystei^ious nor frif^hteninf; when we
do not inptitutionalis'.e thehi out uf the picture. It is
characteristic of the aton.isn and youth orientation of our
society that most nei(?hborhoods
,
excepting some ethnic
coinniunitles, are extremely secrefrated by ar;e . We take
every opportunity we can to separate out "the elderly,"
and not merely in a /^eopraphic sense. And as with the
case of alienation they (generally accept this as normal;
the vray the v/orld is.
These inadequacies all suf-gest the need for a More
radical lon^: ranfje perspective on community. This per-
spective is not one that can or should easily be imposed
by covernnient. Jiut it sug^^ests that communal movements
"outside" the system can play a vital role by attempting
to use technolog-y to create a far more decentralized and
less alienating form of work life whore people can relate
thought to action more immediately. Such work life should
be closely integrated to community life, as will be much
more feasible with smaller scale enterprise. In addition
these communities should strive not merely for racial
integration but also for generational integration, some-
thing most of today's coiumunos have lacked. A large part
of r.uch a community must also be an educational system
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Which places far loso stress on competition and individual
achievon^ont. Cooperation and Uun^an h^tppiness uust replace
achievement and personal rewards as hallmarks of the
educational systeui,
A communal movement outside the system is not a
"cop out" and should not be discourafyed by political
activists. Successful communes can sutTftest new economic
arran^rements and life styles to persons too fully shaped
by our alienating work life and fragmented conn.iunities
.
These men and women have been so deprived of other satis-
factions that far too much lecarninf? is derived from the
cccumulaticn of material goods. New communal
.'\rran;?cmcr.t
s
may be Utopian in the sense that they cannot soon be
realized by the v/hole society, but they will constantly
challenge those within existing structures to make further
reforms. New communities will also create new people, who
will challenge the present society by demanding reforms.
They can be a refuge for new activists and can pump new
blood into the system.
Those who participate in reformist politics and those
who form Utopian movements each need the other. Reforms
prepare the way for a new culture. More local neigh-
borhood freedom will mean greater chances for experiment.
Men in nonalienating work will bo fuller political par-
ticipants and make the As'liole concept seem more feasible
16k
to '..ealistic'. observers. Without Utopian co.nnmnities and
constant protest a^^ain.st the system too many of these
reforns can be perverted to old uses. Participant r-^forms
can become further tools of manipulation by corporations
and political machines. The full f^onius of a Kousseauian
perspective on contemporary America lies in its call for
^jradualist reforms to open new possibilities within the
system and the emer^rence of a nev view of man, work,
politics and deniocracy. The development of a new view
in these areas can open up new perspectives and debates
in our political life, allowing: specific reforms to
become catalysts for Xuxthei^ citan,-^©.
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CONCLUblON
In this thesis I have tried to show that an often
unai-ticul.nted and unexamined conception of human nature
underlies somo of the most influential work in luodern
political science. IJecauso many political scientists are
unaware of t]ie ways in which certain basic assumptions
underlie their methods and outlooks they are in an in-
adequate position to assess these.
This is especially snd at this juncture for at least
two major reasons. Soine important n.'odern philosoplicrs
have advanced arr^uments v/hich tend to undermine the basic
assumptions of tl)e abstract individualist conception of
human nature and the view of social science and moral
discourse v/ith which it is associated. Conceptions of
human v\rill and purpose have {gained a new respectability
as we co^ie to recoi'^^niise the problems involved in viewing
human bcini';s as essentially similar to neutrons. Per-
sistent problems about causality and free will }iave been
unsolved in this tradition: intuitively even social
scientists know Iniiuan bein/;s cannot f^ct alonf^ without a
vocabulary of (i^ood and evil, {;':uilt and resentment. Yet
what can such a vocabulary moan if we are all atoms whose
bo);avlor Is <k; termined and predictable. Tlie nature of
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.re badly n.i sundorst ood
, particularly
the way in u-hich our social and historical dcvelopn.ent
contributes to the euer^^ence of our needs. I have dis-
cussed .omo or those pl^ilosopLical arfjurnents in the course
of this thesis, but i>any contemporary political scientists
are unfandliar with or Tail to see the si,,niricance of what
is occurrin,-: in the philosophical community. There is
Great need for serious consideration of these issues from
the side or politicaJ science because they have so
important a bearing on how the political scientist works.
The political scientist i.mst begin to consider these
issues if his whole system is not to be built on a collap-
sin^T foundation, and the best way in which to shore up
that foundation is to study systematic critiques of it and
their implications.
This thesis has focused on an intellectual tradition
and the theoretical problems in that tradition. But
obviously the problems with that tradition are not merely
thoorntical. To deal with some of the practical problems
briefly alludeci to at tlie end of my thesis v/e need at
least to consider raaical alternatives to our present
modes of handlin/r problems. The days of unexamined business
as usual hopefully will not be much lon{-er tolerated. And
so the needs lor exaiiiin t tion of a different perspective on
man and the study of liis societies is not merely tlio
intellectual's pr.blenu It is a problem for all or us as
citizens.
If there are intellectual obstacles to such a reexam-
in^.tion in a stuooornly held and self
-sustaininrc ideology,
there are also practical ones. My thesis has ,viven scant
consideration t. these latter. For there are not merely
intellectual barriers standin^^ in the way of the in>plc-
mentation of a radically different society. The very
scale of our society nakes extremely difficult the
realization of a Uousseauian v/orld. I have briefly
mentioned some of the practical directions in whicli we
would have to devote attention, but hopeiully the diffi-
culty of the task will not prevent us from beginning to
ask the touf^h practical questions of how to deal with our
society here and now. liousseau may be a Utopian, but the
Utopian vision can become an important stimulant to
eventual prof^ress.
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